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Abstract
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for mechanism design
with limited commitment. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich
enough to replicate the payoffs of any equilibrium in a mechanism-selection
game between an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent. A
cornerstone of our methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode
not only the rules that determine the allocation, but also the information
the designer obtains from the interaction with the agent. Therefore, how
much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited
commitment, becomes an explicit part of the design. We show how this
insight can be used to transform the designer’s problem into a constrained
optimization one: To the usual truthtelling and participation constraints,
one must add the designer’s sequential rationality constraint.
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1 Introduction
The standard assumption in dynamic mechanism design is that the designer can
commit to long-term contracts. This assumption is useful: It allows us to charac-
terize the best possible payoff for the designer in the presence of adverse selection
and/or moral hazard, and it is applicable in many settings. Often, however, this
assumption is done for technical convenience. Indeed, when the designer can com-
mit to long-term contracts, the mechanism-selection problem can be reduced to
a constrained optimization problem thanks to the revelation principle.1 However,
as the literature starting with Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1988) shows, when the
designer can only commit to short-term contracts, the tractability afforded by the
revelation principle is lost. Indeed, mechanism design problems with limited com-
mitment are difficult to analyze without imposing auxiliary assumptions either on
the class of contracts the designer can choose from, as in Gerardi and Maestri
(2018) and Strulovici (2017), or on the length of the horizon, as in Skreta (2006,
2015).
This paper provides a “revelation principle” for dynamic mechanism-selection
games in which the designer can only commit to short-term contracts. We study
a game between an uninformed designer and an informed agent with persistent
private information. Although the designer can commit within each period to the
terms of the interaction–the current mechanism–he cannot commit to the terms the
agent faces later on, namely, the mechanisms that are chosen in the continuation
game. First, we show there is a class of mechanisms that is sufficient to replicate
all equilibrium payoffs of the mechanism-selection game. Second, we show how
this insight can be used to transform the designer’s problem into a constrained
optimization one: To the usual truthtelling and participation constraints, one
must add the designer’s sequential rationality constraint.
The starting point of our analysis is the class of mechanisms we allow the designer
to select from. Following Myerson (1982) and Bester and Strausz (2007), we
consider mechanisms defined by a communication device and an allocation rule as
1The “revelation principle” denotes a class of results in mechanism design; see Gibbard
(1973), Myerson (1979), and Dasgupta et al. (1979).
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illustrated in Figure 1:
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Figure 1: Mechanisms: communication device, pM,β, Sq, and allocation rule, α
Having observed her private information (her type, v P V ), the agent privately
reports an input message, m P M , into the mechanism; this then determines the
distribution, βp¨|mq, from which an output message, s P S, is drawn. In turn,
the output message determines the distribution, αp¨|sq, from which the allocation
is drawn. The output message and the allocation are publicly observable: They
constitute the contractible parts of the mechanism.
When the designer has commitment power, the revelation principle implies that,
without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to mechanisms satisfying the
following three properties: (i) M “ V , (ii) M “ S, and (iii) β is “invertible.” By
β being “invertible,” we mean the designer learns the input message by observing
the output message; in this case, the designer learns the agent’s type report upon
observing the output message. Moreover, the revelation principle implies we can
restrict attention to equilibria in which the agent reports her type truthfully, which
means the designer not only learns the agent’s type report upon observing the
output message, but also he learns the agent’s true type.
It is then clear why restricting attention to mechanisms that satisfy properties
(i)-(iii) and truthtelling equilibria is with loss of generality under limited commit-
ment: Upon observing the output message, the designer learns the agent’s type
report and hence her type. Then the agent may have an incentive to misreport if
the designer cannot commit not to react to this information. This is precisely the
intuition behind the main result in Bester and Strausz (2001), which is the first
paper to provide a general analysis of optimal mechanism design with limited com-
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mitment. The authors restrict attention to mechanisms in which the cardinality of
the set of input and output messages is the same and β is “invertible.” They show
that to sustain payoffs in the Pareto frontier, mechanisms in which input messages
are type reports are without loss of generality. However, focusing on truthtelling
equilibria is with loss of generality. In a follow-up paper, Bester and Strausz (2007)
lift the restriction on the class of mechanisms (i.e., (ii) and (iii) above) and show
in a one-period model that focusing on mechanisms in which input messages are
type reports and truthtelling equilibria is without loss of generality. The authors,
however, do not characterize the output messages. It is also not clear whether
taking input messages to be type reports is without loss when the designer and
the agent interact repeatedly (see the discussion after Theorem 3.1).
The main contribution of this paper is to show that, under limited commitment,
taking the set of output messages to be the set of posterior beliefs of the designer
about the agent’s type, that is, S “ ∆pV q, is without loss of generality. Theorem
3.1 shows that in a general mechanism-selection game between an uninformed
designer and an informed agent introduced in Section 2, any equilibrium payoff
can be replicated by an equilibrium in which (a) the designer uses mechanisms in
which input messages are type reports and output messages are beliefs, (b) the
agent always participates in the mechanism, and (c) input and output messages
have a literal meaning: The agent reports her type truthfully, and if the mechanism
outputs a given posterior, this posterior coincides with the belief the designer holds
about the agent’s type given the agent’s strategy and the mechanism. Given that
any equilibrium payoff can be replicated by mechanisms in which input messages
are type reports and output messages are beliefs about the agent’s type, we call
this class of mechanisms canonical.
Theorem 3.1 implies that when the designer is subject to sequential rationality
constraints, the mechanism serves a dual role within a period. On the one hand, it
determines the allocation for that period. On the other hand, it determines the in-
formation about the agent that is carried forward in the interaction. An advantage
of the language of posterior beliefs is that it avoids potential infinite-regress prob-
lems. Indeed, in a finite horizon problem, an alternative set of output messages
could be a recommendation for an allocation today and a sequence of allocations
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from tomorrow on.2 In the final period, the revelation principle in Myerson (1982)
pins down the implementable allocations. Therefore, the recommended allocations
can be determined via backward induction. This idea cannot be carried to an in-
finite horizon setting: These sets of output messages would necessarily have to
make reference to the continuation mechanisms, which are themselves defined by
a set of output messages.
Another contribution of our analysis is to show that to characterize equilibrium
payoffs of the game between the designer and the agent, it suffices to consider a
simpler game, denoted the canonical game. We record this result in Proposition
3.1. In the canonical game–studied in Section 3.2–the designer is restricted to offer
mechanisms in which input messages are type reports and output messages are be-
liefs over the agent’s type. Theorem 3.1 (trivially) implies an equilibrium outcome
of the canonical game can be achieved by strategy profiles in which the principal
employs mechanisms that induce the agent to truthfully report his type and to
always participate. However, the principal has fewer deviations in the canonical
game and an equilibrium strategy may not be an equilibrium if the principal can
deviate to any mechanism, as he can in the mechanism-selection game. One may
then wonder whether analyzing the canonical game gives, unintentionally, some
commitment power to the principal.
Proposition 3.1 shows this is not the case: Leveraging the construction used to
establish Theorem 3.1, we show that, without loss of generality, the best devia-
tion in the mechanism-selection game is equivalent to a deviation to a canonical
mechanism that induces the agent to report truthfully and to participate with
probability one. In a finite horizon setting, Proposition 3.1 justifies writing the
designer’s problem as a sequence of maximization problems over canonical mecha-
nisms subject to the agent’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints
and the designer’s sequential rationality constraints.
Section 4 illustrates the methodology for the case of transferable utility and
preferences that satisfy increasing differences in distributions. The resulting pro-
gram allows us to highlight the connection between our problem and the literature
2See Section 5.1 for a formal discussion of the approach and its potential issues.
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on information design; after all, the designer can be thought of as a sender who
designs the information structure for a receiver, who happens to be his future
self. However, there are differences. In our setting, the first-period principal (the
sender in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) also takes an action for each posterior
he induces. In addition, the first-period principal’s objective function depends on
the prior as well as the posterior, whereas in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), it
only depends on the posterior. Finally, the first-period principal cannot implement
any Bayes’ plausible distribution over posteriors, but only those that satisfy the
incentive compatibility and participation constraints of the agent.
An important difference between the mechanisms used by Hart and Tirole (1988),
Laffont and Tirole (1988), Freixas et al. (1985), and Bester and Strausz (2001) and
the ones considered here is that whereas in the former papers, the principal ob-
serves the agent’s choice out of a menu of contracts, here, the agent’s input into
the communication device is not observed. Under the assumptions of Section 4,
Proposition 5.2 in Section 5.2 characterizes the mechanisms (i.e., the communica-
tion device and allocation pairs) that can be implemented with the agent making
a choice out of a menu. The result is useful for the following reasons. First, by
checking whether the solution to the program studied in Section 4 satisfies the
conditions in Proposition 5.2, we can understand whether the modeling of a mech-
anism as a menu of contracts in the aforementioned works is without loss. Second,
when the solution to the program does satisfy the conditions, it allows the analyst
to propose a “simple” implementation of the optimum.
The paper contributes to the literature on mechanism design with limited com-
mitment, referenced throughout the introduction.3 A large literature studies the
effect of limited commitment within a specific class of “mechanisms”: The papers
in the durable-good monopolist literature (Bulow (1982); Gul et al. (1986); Stokey
(1981)) study price dynamics and establish (under some conditions) Coase’s con-
jecture whereby a monopolist essentially loses all profits if he lacks commitment.
In an analogous vein, Burguet and Sakovics (1996), McAfee and Vincent (1997),
3A designer’s lack of commitment can take various forms, not considered in this paper,
but that have been studied in other papers. See, for instance, McAdams and Schwarz (2007),
Vartiainen (2013), and Akbarpour and Li (2018), in which the designer cannot commit even to
the obey the rules of the current mechanism.
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Caillaud and Mezzetti (2004), and Liu et al. (2018) study equilibrium reserve-price
dynamics without commitment in different setups. The common thread is, again,
that the seller’s inability to commit reduces monopoly profits.
Mechanism-selection in a dynamic environment with limited commitment is con-
sidered in Deb and Said (2015). The authors study a model of sequential screening,
in which new buyers arrive over time. Like in Skreta (2006) and Skreta (2015), Deb
and Said (2015) consider general mechanisms but a finitely long interaction. In-
finitely long contract-selection games are studied in Strulovici (2017) and Gerardi
and Maestri (2018). The former studies renegotiation and finds that equilibrium
allocations become efficient as the parties become arbitrarily patient. In Gerardi
and Maestri (2018), however, the limit allocation is inefficient whenever firing the
agent–what the authors refer to “firing allocation”– is not a solution when there
is commitment.
By highlighting the role that the designer’s beliefs about the agent play in mech-
anism design with limited commitment, our paper also relates to Lipnowski and
Ravid (2017) and Best and Quigley (2017), who study models of direct communi-
cation between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver.4 Lipnowski and
Ravid (2017) show how the posterior approach of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)
can be used to characterize equilibrium outcomes, and study their properties in
the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) (the leading model of com-
munication without commitment), when the sender’s preferences do not depend
on the state of the world.5 Finally, given that the search for the best equilibrium
often reduces to solving a constrained information design problem we relate to,
among others, Le Treust and Tomala (2017), Georgiadis and Szentes (2018), and
Boleslavsky and Kim (2018).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
notation. Section 2.1 analyzes a simple version of the model in Skreta (2006); it
allows us to introduce the main ideas of the paper in a simple and well-known
4Salamanca (2016) studies mediated communication in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
5Golosov and Iovino (2016) study a social insurance model with a continuum of agents, where
private information is not persistent across stages. They leverage the resulting repeated-game
structure to solve for the best equilibrium.
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setting. Section 2.2 discusses the modeling assumptions. Section 3 introduces the
main theorem and provides a sketch of the proof. Section 4 specializes the results
to the two-period model of Bester and Strausz (2007) with transferable utility
and single-crossing preferences. We compare the solution of the ‘relaxed’ problem
to the information design model of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Section 5.1
discusses using recommendations as output messages. Section 5.2 studies imple-
mentation when the principal observes the agent’s choice. Section 5.3 discusses
an example with multiple agents. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. The
supplementary material (Sections I-III) contains omitted proofs and extensions
discussed throughout the main text.
2 Model
Primitives There are two players: a principal (he) and an agent (she). They
interact over T ď 8 periods. Before the game starts, the agent observes her type,
v P V . V is any finite set; however, the main insights extend to the case in which
V is a Polish space (see Appendix III). Each period, as a result of the interaction
between the principal and the agent, an allocation a P A is determined. Assume
A is a compact (possibly finite) space.
Given a sequence of allocations at “ pa0, a1, ...., atq, the principal can only choose
at`1 P Apatq. That is, there is a correspondence A : ŤTn“0An ÞÑ A such that for
t P N, at P At, Apatq describes the set of allocations the principal can offer given
the allocations he has offered in the past. Assume A is compact-valued and there
exists an allocation a˚ P A such that a˚ is always available.6
Payoffs are defined as follows. For the principal, assume there exists a function,
W : AT ˆ V ÞÑ R such that his payoff from allocation a P AT when the agent’s
type is v is given by W pa, vq. Similarly for the agent, when her type is v, her
payoff from allocation a P AT is given by Upa, vq.
6We later use allocation a˚ to model the agent’s participation decision within each period:
If the agent prefers not to participate, allocation a˚ is implemented automatically. For instance,
in a trade model such as the one in Section 2.1, a˚ corresponds to no trade and no transfers.
The constraint correspondence A also allows us to capture that the agent can walk away from
the mechanism as in Gerardi and Maestri (2018): We could specify that the first time a˚ is
implemented, then this allocation is the only one available thereafter.
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Mechanisms: In each period, the principal offers the agent a mechanism, Mt “
xpMMt , βMt , SMtq, αMty, which consists of a communication device, pMMt , βMt , SMtq,
and an allocation rule, αMt , where
βMt : MMt ÞÑ ∆˚pSq
αMt : SMt ÞÑ ∆˚pAq,
and where ∆˚pCq denotes the set of distributions on C with finite support. We
endow the principal with a collection pMi, SiqiPI of input and output message
sets in which each Mi is finite, |V | ď |Mi|, and ∆pMiq Ď Si.7 Moreover, we
assume pV,∆pV qq is an element in that collection. Denote by M the set of all
mechanisms with message sets pMi, SiqiPI . A mechanism is canonical if pV,∆pV qq
are its sets of input and output messages. Let MC denote the set of canonical
mechanisms and let MCt denote an element in that set.
Three remarks are in order. First, the restriction that Mi has at least as many
messages as types is without loss of generality. The principal can always replicate
a mechanism with a smaller set of input messages by using a larger set of input
messages.8 Second, we restrict the principal to design βMt and αMt to be dis-
tributions with finite support, thus allowing us to focus on the novel conceptual
features of the environment, as opposed to dealing with measure-theoretic com-
plications. To replicate any equilibrium of the game when the principal selects
distributions with finite support using canonical mechanisms, we find the princi-
pal only needs to use distributions with finite support. This last observation, of
course, would not be true if the set of types were not finite.9,10 Finally, we restrict
the principal to choose input and output messages within the set pMi, SiqiPI . This
allows us to have a well-defined set of deviations for the principal, avoiding set-
theoretic issues related to self-referential sets. The analysis that follows shows
7Technically, we only need that Si contains an image of ∆pMiq.
8To see this, suppose the principal would rather use a mechanism, M1t, with a message
space MM
1
t with cardinality strictly less than |V |. Then he can choose a mechanism Mt with
MMt “ V , choose β to coincide with βM1t on the first |MM1t | messages, and have βMt coincide
with βM
1
tp¨|m11q for all remaining messages.
9Appendix III extends our result to the case in which V is a compact and metrizable space.
10We conjecture, however, that the restriction to distributions with finite support is without
loss of generality when the set of types is finite.
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that the choice of the collection plays no further role in the analysis.
Timing: In each period t,
- The principal and the agent observe a draw from a correlating device ω „
U r0, 1s.
- The principal offers the agent a mechanism Mt.
- The agent observes the mechanism and decides whether to participate (p “
1) or not (p “ 0). If she does not participate, a˚ is implemented and the
game proceeds to t` 1.
- If she participates, she privately submits a report m PMMt .
- s P SMt is drawn according to βMtp¨|mq, which is publicly observed.
- a P A is drawn according to αMtp¨|sq, which is publicly observed.
This defines an extensive form game, which we dub the mechanism-selection game.
If, instead, the principal can only choose mechanisms in MC , we denote it as the
canonical game.
Public histories in this game are11
ht “ pω0,M0, p0, s0, a0, . . . , ωt´1,Mt´1, pt´1, st´1, at´1, ωtq,
where pr P t0, 1u denotes the agent’s participation with the restriction that pr “
0 ñ sr “ H, ar “ a˚. Public histories capture what the principal knows through
period t. Let H t denote the set of all period t public histories. A strategy for the
principal is then given by Γt : H
t ÞÑ ∆pMq.
A history for the agent consists of the public history of the game together with
the agent’s inputs into the mechanism (henceforth, the agent history) and her
11The restriction that the support of βMtp¨|mq is finite for m P MMt , together with the
finiteness of MMt , imply that there are output messages s P SMt that can never arise. Thus, we
can remove from the tree all the histories that are consistent with mechanism Mt being offered
and s P SMt such that řmPMMt βMtps|mq “ 0, without affecting the equilibrium set. However,
for tractability, we do not make this distinction in our notation.
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private information. Formally, an agent history is an element
htA “ pω0,M0,m0, p0, s0, a0, . . . , ωt´1,Mt´1, pt´1,mt´1, st´1, at´1, ωtq.
Given a public history ht, let H tAphtq denote the set of agent histories consistent
with ht. The agent also knows her type, and hence a history through period t is
an element of tvu ˆH tA when her type is v. The agent’s participation strategy is
piv : H
t
A ˆMt ÞÑ r0, 1s. Conditional on participating in the mechanism Mt, her
reporting strategy is a distribution rvphtA,Mt, 1q P ∆pMMtq for each of her types
v and each htA P H tA.
A belief for the principal at the beginning of time t, history ht, is a distribution
µphtq P ∆pVˆH tAphtqq, whereH tAphtq is the set of agent histories that are consistent
with the public history ht, which is observed by the principal. The principal is thus
uncertain both about the agent’s payoff-relevant type, v, and her payoff-irrelevant
type, htA.
Our focus is on studying the equilibria of the mechanism-selection and canonical
games. By equilibrium, we mean Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (henceforth, PBE),
defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a tuple xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y
such that for each ht the following hold:
1. Given µt˚ phtq, Γt˚ phtq is sequentially rational given ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV ,
2. Given Γ˚phtq, piv˚ phtA, ¨q, rv˚ phtA, ¨, 1q are sequentially rational for all htA P
H tAphtq,
3. µ˚phtq is derived via Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Implicit in the definition of PBE is the assumption that the principal does not
update his beliefs about the agent following a deviation by the principal. That is,
we assume beliefs are pre-consistent (see Hendon et al. (1996)).
Remark 2.1. [Belief updating depends only on the realized output message] Fix
a history ht. Given µ P ∆pV ˆH tAphtqq and a mechanism MMt , Bayesian updating
depends on the agent’s strategy and the communication device, but not on the
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allocation rule. To see this, suppose the agent participates with positive probability
in the mechanism, the output message is s P SMt and allocation a is observed;
then the principal’s belief about the agent being at history pv, htA,Mt, 1, s, aq is
given by
µphtqpv, htAqpiv˚ phtA,Mtq
ř
mPMMt rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtps|mqαMtpa|sqř
v˜,ĂhtA µpv˜,ĂhtAqpi˚˜v pĂhtA,Mtqřm˜PMMt r˚˜v pĂhtA,Mt, 1qpm˜qβMtps|m˜qαMtpa|sq ,
and all the terms concerning αMtpa|sq drop out.
2.1 Example: two-period sale of a durable good.
To fix ideas, consider the following example. The principal is a seller who owns
one unit of a durable good and assigns value 0 to it. The agent is a buyer whose
valuation for the good is her private information. The buyer’s valuation can take
two values, v P tvL, vHu, where vH ´ vL ą 0. The seller’s belief that v “ vH is µ1.
An allocation is a pair pq, tq P t0, 1u ˆ R, where q indicates whether a sale occurs
(q “ 1) or not (q “ 0), and t is a transfer from the buyer to the seller. Utilities
are quasilinear so that the buyer’s utility is upq, t; vq “ vq ´ t and the seller’s is
wpq, t; vq “ t. Both players share a common discount factor δ P p0, 1q.
The timing is as follows: in each period t P t1, 2u
- The seller chooses a mechanism.
- The buyer observes the mechanism and decides whether to participate.
– If she does not participate, the good is not sold and no payments are
made; if t “ 1, we move to period 2.
– If she participates, the mechanism determines the allocation.
- If the good is not sold and t “ 1, move on to t “ 2.
Because the horizon is finite, we can solve the game by backward induction.
Then let t “ 2 and denote by µ2 the seller’s posterior belief that v “ vH . In t “ 2,
the seller has full commitment and the solution is routine. The seller posts a price
equal to vL when µ2 ă vL{vH ” µ, a price equal to vH when µ2 ą µ, and at µ2 “ µ,
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then the seller is indifferent between the two prices. Thus, the seller’s revenue as
a function of µ2 is given by
R2pµ2q “
#
vL if µ2 ď µ
µ2vH otherwise
“
#
µ2vH ` p1´ µ2qvˆLpµ2q if µ2 ď µ
µ2vH otherwise
,
where vˆLpµ2q “ vL ´ pµ2{p1 ´ µ2qqpvH ´ vLq and the equality follows from noting
that when the price is vL, the seller leaves rents vH ´ vL with probability µ2 to the
high type.
We now turn to period 1. Recall that µ1 denotes the probability that the buyer’s
valuation is vH . Consistent with the mechanism-selection game introduced in
Section 2, we allow the seller to offer the buyer a mechanism that consists of a
communication device pM1, β1, S1q and an allocation rule α : S1 ÞÑ ∆pt0, 1u ˆ Rq.
The assumption of quasilinearity implies that, without loss of generality, the seller
does not randomize on the transfers, so that α1pq, t|s1q “ qps1q ˆ 1rt “ tps1qs.
Theorem 3.1 shows that, without loss of generality, input messages are type
reports, M1 “ V , and output messages are the seller’s beliefs about the buyer’s
valuation, S1 “ ∆pV q. We now provide intuition for this in the context of the
example.
1. To see that M1 “ V , note that β1 together with the agent’s reporting strategy
induces another distribution on S1,ÿ
m1PM1
β1ps1|m1qrvpm1q ” β˚ps1|vq.
If the seller offers xpV, β˚, S1q, α1yq to the buyer, then the buyer tells the
truth (see also Bester and Strausz (2007)).
2. To see why S1 can be taken to be ∆pV q, note that upon the realization of s1,
two things happen. First, the allocation αps1q is determined. Second, if the
allocation is no trade, s1 is used to update the principal’s beliefs as follows:
µ2pv “ vH |s1q
˜ÿ
vPV
µ1pvqβ˚ps1|vq
¸
“ µ1pvHqβ˚ps1|vHq,
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where we have already used that M1 “ V and the buyer reports truthfully.
Given the belief induced by s1, we know what happens in period 2; there is
no use for s1 beyond that. Thus, we can take S1 “ ∆pV q. Thus, we write
βpµ2|vq, qpµ2q, tpµ2q instead of βps1|vq, qps1q, tps1q thereafter.
With these observations, we can describe the seller’s optimal mechanism in period
1 via the following program:
R1pµ1q ” max
β,q,t
ÿ
µ2P∆pV q
˜ÿ
vPV
µ1pvqβpµ2|vq
¸
rtpµ2q ` p1´ qpµ2qqδR2pµ2qs
subject to for all v P tvL, vHu:ÿ
µ2P∆pV q
βpµ2|vqpvqpµ2q ´ tpµ2q ` δp1´ qpµ2qquBpµ2, vqq ě 0 (PCv)ÿ
µ2P∆pV q
pβpµ2|vq ´ βpµ2|v1qqpvqpµ2q ´ tpµ2q ` δp1´ qpµ2qquBpµ2; vqq ě 0 (ICv,v1)
µ2pvHq
˜ÿ
vPV
µ1pvqβpµ2|vq
¸
“ µ1pvHqβpµ2|vHq (BCµ2).
That is, the seller chooses β, q, t to maximize his profit subject to the agent’s
participation and incentive compatibility constraint and a Bayesian consistency
constraint. The latter says that when the mechanism outputs µ2, then µ2 is the
belief that obtains via Bayesian updating. The buyer’s participation and incentive
compatibility constraints take into account her continuation values, denoted by
uBpµ2, vq: For low values of µ2, the high type is served at a low price in period 2.
As usual, we can show that PCvL and ICvH ,vL bind, and these two constraints
imply the others. Therefore, we can use them to replace the transfers in the seller’s
objective to obtain
R1pµ1q ” max
τ,q
ÿ
τP∆pV q
τpµ2q rqpµ2qpµ2vH ` p1´ µ2qvˆLpµ1qq ` δp1´ qpµ2qqR2pµ2;µ1qs
(1)
s.t.
ÿ
µ2P∆pV q
τpµ2qµ2 “ µ1,
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where τpµ2q “ řvPV µ1pvqβpµ2|vq is the probability that µ2 is the induced posterior
and
δR2pµ2;µ1q “
#
δpµ2vH ` p1´ µ2qvˆLpµ1qq if µ2 ă µ
δµ2vH if µ2 ą µ
(2)
is an adjusted version of the seller’s period 2 revenue. We now explain equations
(1) and (2) in detail. Equation (1) shows that the seller’s period 1 problem can be
solved by finding (i) a trade probability for each posterior and (ii) a distribution
over posteriors that averages out to the prior. Given a posterior µ2, the trade
probability, qpµ2q, is chosen to maximize a version of the virtual surplus, familiar
from mechanism design with commitment. To see this, note that in equation (1),
the probability of each type is evaluated using the posterior µ2, but the virtual
value for the low type is computed using the prior µ1. This reflects that the seller
in period 1 assigns probability µ1 to v “ vH , and µ1 is the rate at which he pays
rents to the high type. Similarly, δR2pµ2;µ1q adjusts the revenues in period 2 by
the rents the period 1 seller must leave to the buyer: In effect, should the period
1 seller induce µ2 ă µ, the buyer obtains a rent of δpvH ´ vLq, which the seller in
period 1 has to take into account.
Note that equation (2) does not specify what the seller’s payoff is when µ2 “
µ. This, in fact, depends on the prior µ1: When µ2 “ µ, the period 2 seller
is indifferent between prices vH and vL. The period 1 seller, however, is not
indifferent; this fact is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 below:
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δvˆLpµ1q
µ¯
µ2
δR2p¨;µ1q
δµvH
Figure 2: µ1 ď µ¯
δvˆLpµ1q
µ¯
µ2
δR2p¨;µ1q
δµvH
Figure 3: µ¯ ă µ1
If the seller’s prior is such that he would sell to the low valuation buyer today
pµ1 ď µq, then he would rather have the period 2 seller also serve the low valuation
type when indifferent in period 2, as illustrated in Figure 2. However, if the period
1 seller would prefer to exclude the high valuation buyer when her valuation is
low, then he would prefer the low valuation buyer to be excluded in period 2 as
well when µ2 “ µ, as illustrated in Figure 3.
In what follows, we solve the seller’s problem for the case in which µ1 ą µ.12
Because the seller can choose qpµ2q for each µ2, the best he can do is choose it to
pointwise maximize the objective function in equation (1), as illustrated in Figures
4 and 5 below:
12The case in which µ1 ă µ is immediate: The seller can achieve the commitment solution by
selling to both types of the buyer in period 1.
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δvˆLpµ1q
µ¯
µ2
δR2p¨;µ1q
δµ2vH
µ2vH ` p1´ µ2qvˆLpµ1q
Figure 4: Value of setting qpµ2q “ 0
(black) and qpµ2q “ 1 (blue)
δvˆLpµ1q
µ¯
µ2
δR2p¨;µ1q
maxtµ2vH ` p1´ µ2qvˆLpµ1q, δR2pµ2;µ1qu
Figure 5: Pointwise maximum of the
blue and black lines in Figure 4
This reduces the principal’s problem to that of finding a distribution over pos-
teriors to solve:
max
τ
ÿ
µ2P∆pV q
τpµ2qmaxtµ2vH ` p1´ µ2qvˆLpµ1q, δRpµ2;µ1qu,
subject to the constraint that the distribution must average to the prior. Under
some parameter values, the solution is as depicted in Figure 6 below:13
13When µ ă µ1, there are two possible solutions depending on the parameter values. When
µ1 ą µ is high enough, we obtain the solution depicted in Figure 6 and described in the main
text. For lower values of µ1 ą µ, we obtain the solution familiar to the literature on the ratchet
effect (see Hart and Tirole (1988)). In this case, the seller sets a price of vL in period 2, and a
price of vH ´ δ∆v in period 1; the buyer buys in period 1 when v “ vH and in period 2 when
v “ vL.
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δvˆLpµ1q
µ¯
µ2
δR2p¨;µ1q
maxtµ2vH ` p1´ µ2qvˆLpµ1q, δR2pµ2;µ1qu
µ1
Figure 6: Optimal mechanism for period 1 seller: The black dashed line depicts the
concavification of the function in Figure 5
The seller sets a price of vH in periods 1 and 2. The buyer does not buy when her
value is low, whereas the buyer randomizes between buying today and tomorrow
when her value is high. The randomization is such that when the seller sees no
sale at the end of period 1, he attaches probability µ to v “ vH .
The example highlights both how the language of type reports and posterior
beliefs is enough to replicate what the principal can obtain from any other mech-
anism and also how useful this language is to solve mechanism design problems
with limited commitment. Indeed, it allows us to reduce the problem of finding
the best equilibrium for the principal to a constrained optimization problem. In
Section 4, we return to the setting of transferable utility and preferences that sat-
isfy increasing differences and show that the connection between our problem and
information design extends beyond the example.
However, the example does not allow us to highlight some features of the model,
which we discuss in the next section. The reader eager to see the results can skip
to Section 3; however, the discussion may be useful to follow the proof sketch of
the main theorem.
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2.2 Discussion: Randomized allocations and public correlating device
We now discuss two aspects of the model that do not seem to play a role in the
example, but are important in what follows: The principal is allowed to offer a
randomization over allocations, and the principal and the agent have access to a
public correlating device.
Randomized allocations There are two reasons for allowing the principal to
choose randomized allocations. First, randomized allocations are necessary for
the set of input messages to be the set of type reports; this is inherited from the
revelation principle with commitment (see Strausz (2003)). To see this, consider
the situation illustrated in Figure 7 below. The mechanism is simple: If the agent
reports m, then the output message is m and the allocation is a, whereas if she
reports m1, the output is m1 and the allocation is a1. Assume that when her type
is v, the agent sends m and m1 with probability p and 1 ´ p, respectively; thus,
she obtains a and a1 with probability p and 1´ p, respectively.
v
m
m1
a
a1
p
1´ p v v
a
a1
p
1´ p
Figure 7: Agent of type v randomizes over m and m1 generating a randomized
allocation
If we restrict the principal to offer deterministic allocations, then he cannot repli-
cate the agent’s allocation just by asking for a truthful type report. However, if
we allow the principal to offer a mechanism such that when the input is v and
the output is v, the allocation is a randomization between a and a1, then he can
replicate the allocation type v obtains just by soliciting a type report.
Second, randomized allocations are necessary for the set of output messages to be
the set of distributions over the agent’s type. To see this, note that two different
output messages, s and s1, may be associated with two different allocations, a
and a1, but with the same posterior belief, as illustrated in Figure 8 below:
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ss1
µ, a
µ, a1
p
1´ p s2
µ, a
µ, a1
p
1´ p
Figure 8: Two output messages, s and s1, induce same posterior but different
allocations
By allowing the principal to offer randomized allocations, we can collapse s and
s1 to one output message s2 associated to one posterior, µ.
Public correlating device The correlating device is important for output mes-
sages to be the principal’s posterior beliefs about the agent’s type. Note that
two output messages, s and s1, may be associated with two different continuation
equilibria, even if they induce the same allocation and posterior beliefs, as in
Figure 9 below:
s
s1
µ, a, eqbm1
µ, a, eqbm2
p
1´ p s2 µ, a
ω1
ω2
eqbm 1
eqbm 2
p
1´ p
Figure 9: Two output messages, s and s1, induce same posterior and allocations, but
different continuation equilibria
The correlating device allows us to collapse s and s1 into one output message (and
hence, one posterior belief) and coordinate continuation play with the correlating
device, akin to what is done in repeated games. This feature arises, somewhat
trivially, in Section 2.1. In the example, for each posterior belief different from
µ, there is a unique continuation equilibrium in period 2, and hence there is no
need to select amongst continuation equilibria. However, when µ2 “ µ, there are
two continuation equilibria; when we allowed the first-period principal to select
between them, we implicitly made use of a (trivial) correlating device.
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3 Results
Section 3 presents the main results of the paper. Theorem 3.1 shows that any
equilibrium payoff of the mechanism-selection game can be replicated by an equi-
librium in which (a) the designer uses mechanisms in which input messages are
type reports and output messages are beliefs, (b) the agent always participates in
the mechanism, and (c) input and output messages have a literal meaning: The
agent reports her type truthfully, and if the mechanism outputs µ P ∆pV q at the
end of period t, then µ is indeed the belief the principal holds about the agent
at the end of that period. Motivated by Theorem 3.1, Section 3.2 studies the
PBE of the canonical game. It follows immediately from Theorem 3.1 that any
equilibrium payoff of the mechanism-selection game is also an equilibrium payoff
of the canonical game, after adapting the strategy profiles and systems of beliefs
to the canonical game. Because the canonical game has a smaller set of deviations
for the principal than the mechanism-selection game, one may conjecture that
there are dynamic mechanisms consistent with equilibrium in the canonical game,
which would not be consistent with equilibrium in the mechanism-selection game.
Proposition 3.1 shows this conjecture is false.
3.1 Revelation Principle for Sequentially Optimal Mechanism Design
Theorem 3.1. Fix any PBE of the mechanism-selection game, xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y.
Then there exists a payoff-equivalent PBE, xΓ1, ppi1v, r1vqvPV , µ1y, such that
1. At all histories, the principal offers canonical mechanisms, that is, p@htqp@Mt :
Γ1phtqpMtq ą 0q, Mt P C.
2. At all histories where the principal assigns positive probability to the agent’s
type being v, the agent participates with probability 1 when her type is
v, that is, p@v, @htA P H tAqp@Mt P supp Γ1phtqq pi1vphtA,Mtq “ 1 whenever
µ1phtqpvq ą 0.
3. At all histories, the agent reports her type truthfully, that is, p@v, @htA P
H tAqp@Mt P supp Γ1phtqq, r1vphtA,Mt, 1q “ δv.
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4. At all histories, recommended beliefs coincide with realized beliefs t` 1:
µ1pht,Mt, 1, µqpvq “ µ
1phtqpvqβMtpµ|vqř
v1PV µ1phtqpv1qβMtpµ|v1q
“ µpvq.
The proof is in Appendix B. In what follows, we provide a sketch of the main
steps in the proof.
The first main step shows that, without loss of generality, the agent’s participa-
tion and reporting strategy conditions only on her type v and the public history.
This step, which follows from Proposition A.1 in Appendix A, is key to showing
that the set of canonical input messages is the set of type reports. If the agent
conditioned her strategy on the payoff-irrelevant part of her private history, the
principal would need to elicit htA together with v in order to replicate the agent’s
behavior in the mechanism.
We now qualify what we mean by without loss of generality : We show that
given a PBE in which the agent conditions her strategy on the payoff-irrelevant
part of her private history at some public history ht, there exists another payoff-
equivalent PBE in which she does not and in which the principal obtains the
same payoff after each continuation history consistent with ht and the equilibrium
strategy. The proof of this consists of two parts. First, we observe that because
the input messages are payoff irrelevant and unobserved by the principal, if the
agent chooses different strategies at pv, htAq and pv, htA1q, with htA, htA1 P H tAphtq,
then she is indifferent between these two strategies. However, the principal may
not be indifferent between these two strategies. The second part shows we can
build an alternative strategy that does not condition on htA beyond h
t and gives
the principal the same continuation payoff.
This first step also gives us an important conceptual insight: The principal
cannot peak into his past correlating devices. To do so, he would like to ask the
agent to report to him what she did in the previous mechanisms. Proposition A.1
shows that this information cannot be elicited in any payoff-relevant way.
The second main step shows that, without loss of generality, there is a one-to-one
mapping between the output messages used at history ht and the posterior beliefs
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of the principal in the PBE at history ht (see Proposition A.3 in Appendix A). This
step follows mainly from the observations we made in the discussion in Section 2.2.
The principal may have two other uses for the output messages. On the one hand,
because the allocation must be measurable with respect to the output messages,
he may use them to offer a richer set of alternatives. On the other hand, he may
use the output messages to coordinate continuation play. Proposition A.3 shows
that randomized allocations and the access to the public correlating device can
achieve these two goals, respectively.
These two steps deliver that, without loss of generality, input messages can be
taken to be type reports and output messages can be taken to be the designer’s
beliefs about the agent’s type. After all, knowing the agent’s type is all that is
needed to replicate her behavior within the mechanism, and hence the relevant
beliefs for the principal are about the agent’s payoff-relevant type.
Proposition A.2 in Appendix A shows that having the agent participate in the
mechanism is without loss of generality (we discuss at the end of the section why
Theorem 3.1 only requires this for types with positive probability.). The logic is
similar to the one in the case of commitment: Whatever the agent obtains when she
does not participate can be replicated by making her participate. However, there
is a caveat: When the agent does not participate, her outcome is an allocation for
today and a continuation mechanism for tomorrow. Therefore, we must guarantee
that, when the agent participates, the principal still offers the same continuation
as when she did not participate.
With these preliminary steps at hand, the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Appendix
B shows that any mechanism Mt offered by the principal at history h
t can be
replicated by a canonical mechanism MCt “ xpV, βMCt ,∆pV qq, αMCt y as follows.
The second step implies that there is an invertible mapping which maps each
output message into the belief over types that it induces:
σpMtqpstq “
ÿ
htAPHtAphtq,mtPMMt
µ˚pht,Mt, 1, stqpv, htA,Mt, 1,mt, stq.
Note that we obtain the belief over V by taking the marginal over all agent histories
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consistent with the public history ht. Using this, we can define a communication
device βM
C
t : V ÞÑ ∆˚p∆pV qq and an allocation rule αMCt : ∆pV q ÞÑ ∆˚pAq as
follows:
βM
C
t pµ|vq “
ÿ
mPMMt
βMtpσ´1pMtqpµq|mqr˚v phtA,Mt, 1qpmq
αM
C
t pµq “ αMtpσ´1pMtqpµqq.
The proof then shows that when faced with this mechanism, the agent’s best re-
sponse is to participate and report truthfully and that when the principal observes
an output of µ, his beliefs are indeed µ.
We have yet to discuss why Theorem 3.1 only requires that the agent partici-
pates with probability 1 is required for her types to which the principal assigns
positive probability. Consider then a history ht such that the principal’s belief
assigns probability 0 to the agent’s type being v‹. Suppose the principal selects
mechanism Mt. Assume also the agent’s strategy at v
‹ specifies sending an input
message m‹, which assigns positive probability to an output s‹. Finally, assume
that s‹ has zero probability under all other m P MMt . PBE does not impose
restrictions on the principal’s belief when he observes s‹; in particular, it could
be that µ˚pht,Mt, 1, s‹q “ µ˚pht,Mt, 1, s1q, where s1 is an output message with
positive probability under the equilibrium strategy. This would, of course, break
the one-to-one mapping between output messages and posterior beliefs.
To deal with the aforementioned issue, we show that, given a PBE, we can always
modify the mechanisms chosen in equilibrium by the principal so that the agent
does not have access to messages like m‹. Namely, he can make the distribution
of the communication device for any such message the same as that of a message
that is used on the path. The principal can always do this without affecting the
incentives of those types that have positive probability; however, he may change
the participation incentives of those types that have probability 0.
24
3.2 The Canonical Game
Theorem 3.1 shows that any equilibrium payoff of the game between the principal
and the agent can be achieved with the principal selecting at each history a canon-
ical mechanism such that the agent participates with probability one and reports
her type truthfully. This observation motivates the analysis in this section where
we study the equilibria of the canonical game.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 3.1 is the following:
Corollary 3.1. Any PBE payoff of the mechanism-selection game can be achieved
as a PBE payoff of the canonical game.
Because it features a restricted set of choices for the principal, one may suspect
that in the canonical game, the principal is able to implement more mechanisms
than in the mechanism-selection game. However, this is not the case. Indeed, we
show that given any equilibrium of the mechanism-selection game, without loss of
generality, the best deviation for the principal after any history can be achieved by
offering a canonical mechanism for that period and also in the continuation histo-
ries, whereas the agent participates with probability one and truthfully reports her
type. This observation implies the canonical game contains all relevant deviations
for the principal. It is not then possible to achieve payoffs in the canonical game
that cannot be achieved in the mechanism-selection game. This is recorded in
Proposition 3.1 below:
Proposition 3.1. If xΓ˚C , ppi˚Cv , r˚Cv qvPV , µ˚Cy is a PBE of the canonical game,
then there is an equilibrium of the mechanism-selection game xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y
that achieves the same payoff.
Two important lessons follow from Proposition 3.1 and its proof. First, to char-
acterize the equilibrium payoffs of the mechanism-selection game, it suffices to
characterize the equilibrium payoffs of the canonical game.14 Second, the proof of
14It is not obvious that such a result should hold. To see this, we reason by analogy with the
informed principal problem of Myerson (1983), where the principal is also a player, and focusing
on deviations to direct and incentive compatible mechanisms is with loss of generality. Two of the
equilibrium notions Myerson analyzes have analogues in our paper. In expectational equilibria,
the principal can choose from any mechanism, as in the model in Section 2. Undominated
mechanisms are direct incentive compatible mechanisms that weakly dominate any other direct
25
Proposition 3.1 highlights that it is enough for the principal to look among those
canonical mechanisms that incentivize the agent to participate and truthfully re-
port her type. This second observation is important. In finite-horizon settings, it
justifies writing down the principal’s problem as a series of maximization problems
subject to constraints: the participation and incentive compatibility constraints
for the agent and the sequential rationality constraints for the principal. This pro-
vides a game-theoretic foundation for the programs studied by Bester and Strausz
(2001) and Bester and Strausz (2007). In Doval and Skreta (2018b) we show how
this approach also simplifies looking for the best equilibrium for the principal in
an infinite-horizon problem.
4 Transferable utility and increasing differences
Section 4 considers a simplified version of the game in Section 2. The purpose is
to show how one can harness the results in Section 3 to solve for the principal’s
optimal mechanism under limited commitment. In particular, our formulation of
the canonical set of output messages as beliefs allows us to write the principal’s
problem as a constrained information design problem. Using this formulation and
an extension15 of the techniques in Le Treust and Tomala (2017), we characterize
upper bounds on the set of posteriors used in an optimal mechanism. Along the
way, we also highlight the differences between the problem considered here and
the one introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
Consider the following simpler version of the game in Section 2:
- The agent observes her type vi P tv1, . . . , vNu. Let µ0i “ Prpv “ viq.
- The principal offers the agent a mechanism M “ xpM,β, Sq, αy.
- The agent observes M and decides whether to participate.
– If she does not participate, a˚ is implemented.
– If she participates, she privately submits a report m PM :
and incentive compatible mechanism, as in the canonical game in Section 3.2. Myerson shows
that strong solutions, which is a strengthening of undominated mechanisms, are expectational
equilibria, but the reverse does not necessarily hold.
15See Doval and Skreta (2018a) for further details.
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- s P S is drawn according to βp¨|mq, which is publicly observed,
- a P A is drawn according to αp¨|sq, which is publicly observed.
- The principal selects an action y P Y paq, where Y paq Ď Y is a compact
(possibly finite) space.
The non-contractible action y captures in reduced form the principal’s limited com-
mitment: In the example in Section 2.1, y corresponds to the choice of mechanism
in the second period.16 The correspondence Y paq plays the role of the correspon-
dence A in Section 2: It captures how past allocations may affect the principal’s
available choices in the continuation.
The above is the game that underlies the maximization problem analyzed by
Bester and Strausz (2007). Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.1 provide a game-
theoretic foundation for why the search for the principal’s best equilibrium can be
cast in terms of such a program. To facilitate the comparison between the papers,
we follow their notation as much as possible. In what follows, wipa, yq denotes the
principal’s utility when v “ vi; similarly, uipa, yq is the agent’s utility when her
type is vi.
In standard mechanism design fashion, we focus here on the case of transfer-
able utility and increasing differences, leaving the full analysis to Section I in the
Supplementary Material.17 First, we assume A “ Q ˆ R, where q P Q denotes
the physical part of the allocation and t P R denotes a monetary transfer from
the agent to the principal. Hereafter, we take Y pq, tq “ Y pqq, and in a slight
abuse of notation, we denote uipa, yq “ uipq, yq ´ t, wipa, yq “ wipq, yq ` t.18 Sec-
ond, because mechanisms in our setting determine lotteries over outcomes, the
appropriate notion of increasing differences is the one in Kartik et al. (2017):
16The beauty of the simple model is that the non-contractible part of the allocation y may
stand for other forms of contractual incompleteness, such as renegotiation. From this point of
view, we believe the techniques presented herein could be used to understand optimal contract-
ing in other environments of interest, where distortions arise, for instance, from the need to
renegotiate contracts or hold-up problems.
17We comment at the end of this section how the results we obtain translate to the case of
non-transferable utility
18Under transferable utility, if the action y represents the choice of a continuation mechanism,
then the assumption that Y p¨q does not depend on t is innocuous. Section I in the supplementary
material does not restrict how the correspondence Y p¨q depends on a.
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Definition 4.1 (Kartik et al. (2017)). The family tuiuNi“1 satisfies monotonic ex-
pectational differences if for any two distributions P,Q P ∆pA ˆ Y q ş uip¨qdP ´ş
uip¨qdQ is monotonic in i.19
The analysis in Section 3 implies the solutions to the following program charac-
terize the PBE of the aforementioned game:
max
β,α,y
ÿ
i,h
µ0iβi,hr
ÿ
pq,tq
αhpq, tqpwipq, yhpqqq ` tqs (P)
s.t.
$’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’%
ř
h βi,h
ř
pq,tq
αhpq, tqruipq, yhpqqq ´ ts ě 0, i ě 1ř
hpβi,h ´ βk,hq
ř
pq,tq
αhpq, tqruipq, yhpqqq ´ ts ě 0, i, k P t1, 2, ..., Nu, i ‰ k
yhpqq P y˚pµh, qq ” arg maxyPY pqq
Nř
i“1
µh,iwipq, yq
µh,i
Nř
j“1
µ0jβj,h “ µ0iβi,h,
where βi,h “ βpµh|viq, αh “ αp¨|µhq and H “ t1, . . . , Hu indexes the posteriors.
That is, the principal selects the best canonical mechanism from among the ones
that (i) induce participation with probability 1, (ii) induce truthtelling with prob-
ability 1, and (iii) satisfy the principal’s sequential rationality constraints. Implicit
in this program is that the number of posteriors induced by the principal is also a
variable of choice.
The rest of the section proceeds as follows. First, Proposition 4.1 shows how,
under our assumptions, we can simplify the number of constraints in program (P).
Second, we show how to cast the simpler program as a constrained information
design one. Finally, we use this connection to characterize an upper bound on the
number of posteriors in the optimal mechanism.
Transferable utility implies that focusing on mechanisms that do not randomize
on transfers is without loss of generality. Hereafter, we replace t with its ex-
pectation, denoted by th. Like increasing differences in mechanism design with
19Kartik et al. (2017) show that u satisfies monotonic expectational differences if, and only
if, it takes the form uipa, yq “ g1pa, yqf1piq ` g2pa, yq ` cpiq, where g1, g2 are finitely integrable
and f1 is monotonic.
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commitment, monotonic expectational differences implies the solutions to (P) co-
incide with the solutions to a simpler program, which imposes only a subset of
the incentive compatibility constraints. Finally, both assumptions imply that the
participation constraint of the lowest type binds. The above remarks are recorded
in Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.1. If tuiuNi“1 satisfies monotonic expectational differences, then to
characterize the solution to (P), it suffices to guarantee the following hold:
1. The agent’s participation constraint binds when her type is v1.
2. Adjacent incentive constraints are satisfied.
See Appendix D for a proof. In mechanism design with commitment, we could
simplify (P) further by showing the downward-looking20 incentive constraints al-
ways bind at the optimum. This then justifies the study of the so-called relaxed
program:
max
β,α,y
ÿ
i,h
µ0iβi,hr
ÿ
q
αhpqqwipq, yhpqqq ` ths (R)
s.t.
$’’’’&’’’’%
ř
h β1,hr
ř
αhpqqu1pq, yhpqqq ´ ths “ 0,ř
hpβi,h ´ βi´1,hqr
ř
αhpqquipq, yhpqqq ´ ths “ 0, i P t2, ..., Nu
yhpqq P y˚pµh, qq ” arg maxyPY pqqřµh,iwipq, yq”řN
j“1 µ
0
jβj,h
ı
µh,i “ µ0iβi,h
,
obtained by dropping the monotonicity constraints :21ÿ
h
pβi,h ´ βi´1,hq
ÿ
q
αhpqqpuipq, yhpqqq ´ ui´1pq, yhpqqqq ě 0, i P t2, . . . , Nu. (M)
In mechanism design with commitment, it suffices to check that the solution to
the relaxed program satisfies the monotonicity constraints, (M), to show it is the
20That is, the constraints that say vi does not report her type is vi´1.
21The constraints in equation (M) are obtained from combining the restriction that vi does
not want to report vi´1 and vi´1 does not want to report vi. Under Definition 4.1, the binding
downward-looking incentive constraints together with the monotonicity constraints imply the
local constraints in Proposition 4.1.
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solution to (P) (see the discussion in footnote 21).
However, in mechanism design with limited commitment, the solution to the
relaxed program is not necessarily a solution to (P) even if it satisfies the mono-
tonicity constraints, when the type space is finite and there are three or more types.
This is illustrated in Example 2 in Appendix D. Whereas in the relaxed program
the binding downward-looking incentive constraints together with v1’s participa-
tion constraint impose N restrictions on the transfers pthq, the solution to the
relaxed program might use less than N posteriors. Therefore, finding transfers th
that satisfy all constraints may not possible.22 Alternatively, not all downward-
looking constraints may bind in the optimal mechanism.
Fortunately, the above is not an issue when there are two types or a continuum
of types. In both cases, it is possible to show that downward looking constraints
bind (see Appendices D and III). Because most of the literature focuses on one
of these cases, and because the relaxed program provides a useful benchmark, the
rest of this section studies its properties.
We can use the binding constraints to substitute the transfers out of the princi-
pal’s program and obtain the following:
max
τ,α,y
ÿ
h
τpµhq
Nÿ
i“1
µh,i
ÿ
q
αhpqqrwipq, yhpqqq ` ui,h ´ 1´
ř
nďi µ
0
n
µ0i
pui`1,h ´ ui,hqs
s.t.
ÿ
τpµhqµh “ µ0,
where τpµhq “ ři µ0iβi,h and ui,h “ uipq, yhpqqq.
22This is never an issue in mechanism design with commitment: Without loss of generality,
we can always have one transfer for each type.
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Define:
uˆipq, y;µ0q ” uipq, yq ´ 1´
ř
nďi µ
0
n
µ0i
pui`1pq, yq ´ uipq, yqq,
wipα, yµpαqq ` uˆipα, yµpαq;µ0q ”
ÿ
q
αpqqpwipq, yµpqqq ` uˆipq, yµpqq;µ0qq
w˜pα, µ;µ0q ” Eµ
“
wipα, yµpαqqq ` uˆipα, yµpαq;µ0q
‰
,
where uˆi is type i’s virtual utility from pq, yq and w˜ is the expectation according
to µ of the virtual surplus at tα, yµp¨qqu, for some selection yµpqq P y˚pµ, qq (see
Remark 4.1). Moreover, we drop the index h because thinking about these objects
as functions of beliefs µ in what follows is useful.
Program (R) is then equivalent to
max
τ,α,y
Eτ w˜pα, µ;µ0q (3)
s.t. Eτµ “ µ0
That is, the solution to the relaxed problem is obtained by maximizing a version
of the virtual surplus, represented by w˜, and then choosing a distribution over
posteriors that averages out to the prior. Equation (3) generalizes the program
obtained in Section 2.1. The following remark is in order:
Remark 4.1 (Tie-breaking in favor of the principal). So far, we have remained
silent about how yµpqq is chosen, beyond the restriction that yµpqq P y˚pµ, qq. We
can use the function w˜pq, µ;µ0q to determine how to break the possible ties in
y˚ and make the principal’s objective upper-hemicontinuous. In fact, if y, y1 P
y˚pµ, qq, then in the relaxed problem, y is selected as long as
Eµrwipq, yq ` uˆipq, y;µ0qs ě Eµrwipq, y1q ` uˆipq, y1;µ0qs.
In other words, ties are broken in favor of the virtual surplus.
We now illustrate how to solve the program in (3). Towards this, fix the selection
y as in Remark 4.1. Because the program is separable in the allocation, α, across
posteriors, the solution can be obtained in two steps. First, for each posterior
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µ, we maximize w˜p¨, µ;µ0q with respect to α. Denote the value of this problem
wˆpµ;µ0q. Second, we choose τ to maximize wˆpµ;µ0q subject to the constraint that
the posteriors must average out to the prior, µ0. This separability between the
choice of the allocation rule, α, and the communication device, β, is afforded by
ignoring the monotonicity constraints in (M). The latter may impose additional
restrictions on how the allocation varies across different posteriors.
This discussion implies the solution to (3) can be obtained by solving:
max
τ
Eτ max
α
w˜pα, µ;µ0qloooooooomoooooooon
wˆpµ;µ0q
(4)
s.t. Eτµ “ µ0
An advantage of the above formulation is that a straightforward application of
Carathe´odory’s theorem (see Rockafellar (1970)) implies that in (4), the solution
never uses more than N posteriors:23
Proposition 4.2. The solution to (R) uses at most N posteriors.
Then, if the solution to the relaxed program satisfies the monotonicity con-
straints and it is possible to find transfers pthq that satisfy the downward looking
binding incentive constraints, we have found a solution to the principal’s problem,
(P).
In many instances, however, the solution to (R) will fail to satisfy the mono-
tonicity constraints, (M). As we show next, adding as many posteriors as binding
monotonicity constraints at the optimum may be necessary:
Proposition 4.3. Consider the program obtained by adding the monotonicity con-
straints (M) to the relaxed program (R). The solution to the new program uses
at most N ` K posteriors, where K is the number of binding constraints at the
optimum.
The proof is in Appendix D and follows from extending the techniques in Le Treust
23Bester and Strausz (2007) derive this result using methods in semi-infinite linear program-
ming.
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and Tomala (2017) to our setting, where we have multiple inequality constraints
and equality constraints.
Finally, we note the connection between our problem and a constrained infor-
mation design problem holds beyond the case of transferable utility, as illustrated
in Section I in the supplementary material. In particular, we show the assumption
of monotonic expectational differences also reduces the problem to the analysis
of the local incentive constraints. Moreover, we can again bound the number of
posteriors by 3N ´ 1.
Whereas the above formulation harnesses the connection between our problem
and the one studied in information design, we close the section by highlighting two
conceptual differences with this literature. The reader eager to see the results in
the next section can skip it without loss of continuity.
First, the function wˆpµ;µ0q in equation (4) stands for the sender’s objective
function, vˆpµq, in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Recall that in Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011), vˆpµq is the sender’s expected utility of the receiver’s optimal
action when the posterior is µ, where expectations are taken with respect to µ.
Two differences are worth pointing out. First, in our setting, the first-period
principal (the sender in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) also takes an action for
each posterior he induces, because he chooses the allocation α.
Second, the principal’s objective function in equation (3) depends both on the
posterior, µ, and the prior, µ0, whereas in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), it
only depends on the posterior. We already saw an instance of this in the example
studied in Section 2.1. In fact, we saw that the virtual values are calculated using
the prior distribution, because this distribution is the one the principal uses to
calculate the probability with which he leaves rents to the different types of the
agent. That the principal’s payoff depends both on the prior and the posterior
may come as a surprise because when a distribution F can be written as a convex
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combination of distributions Fs, so that F “ řSs“1 λsFs, thenż p1´ F q
f
dF “
Sÿ
s“1
λs
ż
1´ Fs
fs
dFs.
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That is, the posterior information handicap averages out to the prior informa-
tion handicap. Thus, we may have expected that the information handicap in
w˜pα, µ;µ0q could be written solely as a function of µ. Only when the allocation is
the same for all induced posteriors, and hence no type of the agent obtains rents,
we can think of the principal’s objective as only depending on the posterior.
5 Discussion
5.1 Recommendations as output messages
As discussed in the introduction, in the finite-horizon case, there is another candi-
date for a canonical language: In period t, each output message could be associated
to an allocation for period t and a recommended allocation for the subsequent pe-
riods. We use the formulation in Section 4 to discuss this formally.
Section 4 illustrated how the relaxed program can be formulated as an informa-
tion design problem, where the principal in period 1 designs both the allocation for
the agent and the information structure for the principal in period 2 (see equation
(3)).
We borrow the terminology in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and say a mech-
anism is straightforward if S Ď YqPQtqu ˆ Y pqq and after message s “ pqs, ysq,
the principal chooses qs in period 1 to maximize w˜pα, µs;µ0q and ys in period 2 to
maximize
ř
µi,swipqs, yq in period 2, where µs are the beliefs generated by output
message s.
Proposition 5.1. The following are equivalent:
1. There exists a mechanism xpV, β, Sq, αy and a mapping y : SˆQ ÞÑ YqPQY pqq
that solves (R).
24Laura Doval thanks Rene´ Leal Vizcaino for a discussion that led to this observation.
34
2. There exists a mechanism xpV, β,∆pV qq, αy and a mapping y : ∆pV q ˆQ ÞÑ
YqPQY pqq that solves (R).
3. There exists a straightforward mechanism that solves (R).
The proof is in Appendix E. Item 3 highlights that in the relaxed program (R),
the set of output messages can also be taken to be recommendations for both
incarnations of the principal, as in sender-receiver models of information design.
The proposition uses both the separability between the allocation, α, and the
information policy, τ , discussed in Section 4 and that there is a final period in which
the principal takes the non-committed action, y.25 The separability guarantees
the first-period principal chooses to implement allocations q that are optimal for
each posterior he induces for period 2. However, in the case of infinite horizon,
the language of recommendations is self-referential : The principal would need to
recommend the continuation mechanisms, which themselves involve a set of output
messages. Thus, an advantage of the approach we advocate is that we can always
resort to beliefs regardless of the game at hand.
5.2 Implementation via contracts
Section 5.2 characterizes within the environment of Section 4 the tuples pβ, q, yq
that can be implemented using the contracts studied previously in the literature.
An important difference between the mechanisms used by Hart and Tirole (1988),
Laffont and Tirole (1988), Freixas et al. (1985), and Bester and Strausz (2001)
and the ones considered here is that whereas in the former papers, the principal
observes the agent’s choice out of a menu, in the latter, the agent’s input into
the communication device is not observed. A consequence of this is that in the
former setting, the agent has to be indifferent between all the elements of the menu
that she selects with positive probability. By contrast, in our setting, the agent’s
incentive compatibility constraint has to hold in expectation: Although she may
not be indifferent between all the allocations that arise with positive probability
after she communicates with the mechanism, on average, they must be better than
25If the final period corresponded to a design problem, such as the sale of a durable good
example, one could resort to the revelation principle in Myerson (1982) to reduce the principal’s
actions in the final period to the induced allocations.
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what she would obtain by reporting any other type.
Fix a canonical communication device β : V ÞÑ ∆˚p∆pV qq and a tuple pq, yq :
∆pV q ÞÑ Q ˆ Y , where we denote by ypµq “ ypqpµq, µq.26 We want to find
t1 : ∆pV q ÞÑ R such that for all vi P V , for all µ : βpµ|viq ą 0, and for all
µ1 :
ř
v1 βpµ1|v1q ą 0,
uipqpµq, ypµqq ´ t1pµq ě uipqpµ1q, ypµ1qq ´ t1pµ1q. (DIC-P)
Note equation (DIC-P) corresponds to the definition of equivalence in Mookherjee
and Reichelstein (1992).27 Indeed, the problem we intend to solve is similar in
spirit to the one analyzed in the literature that studies the equivalence between
Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation (Manelli and Vincent (2010) and
Gershkov et al. (2013)). However, there are some differences that, although subtle,
turn out to have important implications. First, in that literature, this problem
only makes sense when there are multiple agents, whereas in our case, the source
of randomness the agent faces (the randomization by the communication device)
is endogenously chosen by the principal. Second, allocation and transfers in that
setting depend on the agent’s type, whereas here they depend on the belief induced
when the principal observes the output message. As we show next, this implies
joint restrictions on the communication device and the allocation rule.
As in Section 4, we assume the agent’s preferences satisfy monotonic expecta-
tional differences. Thus, label the types so that v1 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă vN . Note that if
uipq, yq satisfies Definition 4.1, then uipq, yq has increasing differences. In effect,
uipq1, y1q´uipq, yq “ fpiqpg1pq1, y1q´g1pq, yqq`g2pq1, y1q´g2pq, yq, which is strictly
increasing in i as long as g1pq1, y1q ´ g1pq, yq ‰ 0. In what follows, we make the
following assumption:
Assumption 1. For all µ, µ1 P ∆pV q such that přvPV βpµ|vqq ˆ přvPV βpµ1|vqq ą
0, we assume g1pqpµq, ypµqq ´ g1pqpµ1q, ypµ1qq ‰ 0.
26To keep notation simple, we ignore the possibility that q and y may be randomized alloca-
tions. It is immediate that this restriction is not necessary for the results.
27Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) also require that t1 raises the same revenue as t (see
equation (DIC-T) below). We focus for now on the possibility of guaranteeing (DIC-P) holds
and discuss the difficulties associated with guaranteeing the same revenue is collected at the end
of Section 5.2.
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Given two beliefs µ and µ1, let
Dipµ, µ1q ” uipqpµq, ypµqq ´ uipqpµ1q, qpµ1qq
denote the difference in payoffs from pqpµq, ypµqq and pqpµ1q, ypµ1qq, when the agent
type is vi. The content of Assumption 1 is that Dipµ, µ1q is strictly increasing in i.
We have the following:
Proposition 5.2. Suppose the agent’s Bernoulli utility function satisfies Defini-
tion 4.1 and pβ, q, yq satisfies Assumption 1. A necessary and sufficient condition
for pβ, q, yq to satisfy (DIC-P) is that pβ, q, yq satisfies
1. For all i P t1, . . . , Nu and j ą i, for all µ and µ1,
Djpµ1, µq ě Dipµ1, µq, (DIC-M)
whenever µ1pvjqµpviq ą 0.
2. β induces a monotone information structure: We can label the beliefs induced
by pβ, q, yq, tµ1, . . . , µMu so that
(a) If i ă j, then max supp µi ď min supp µj,
(b) For any i, there are at most three beliefs tµi, µi`1, µi`2u for which vi has
positive probability. Moreover, if vi has positive probability in all three,
then µi`1pviq “ 1.
The proof is in Appendix F. The first condition is the equivalent to the standard
monotonicity condition for dominant-strategy incentive compatibility: For any two
beliefs µ and µ1, the utility differential of the allocations pq, yq induced at these
beliefs is higher for higher types. The second is new to our setting. Recall that,
under Assumption 1, Dipµ, µ1q is strictly increasing in i, which places restrictions
on the support of the beliefs induced by the principal’s mechanism. In particular,
to satisfy (DIC-P), when the agent’s type is vi, she must be indifferent between
the allocations pq, yq that correspond to posteriors that assign positive probability
to vi. Monotonic expectational differences implies that when vi is indifferent be-
tween pqpµq, ypµqq and pqpµ1q, ypµ1qq and Dipµ, µ1q ě 0, then all types higher than
37
vi (weakly) prefer pqpµq, ypµqq to pqpµ1q, ypµ1qq (and the opposite holds for lower
types). Assumption 1 then guarantees that higher types cannot be in the support
of µ1 (and the opposite holds for lower types).
Note that we cannot dispense with the assumption that β induces a monotone
information structure. In the example in Appendix B in Bester and Strausz (2007),
the agent can be of one of two types and her utility satisfies Definition 4.1; however,
the optimal mechanism induces three posteriors under which both types have posi-
tive probability and having both types be indifferent between the three allocations
induced by the mechanism is not possible.
Besides allowing us to connect the results in this paper with the previous litera-
ture on mechanism design with limited commitment, the result in Proposition 5.2
is also of practical value. Section 4 highlights that the characterization of S as the
set of beliefs over the agent’s type allows us to harness the tools of mechanism and
information design to solve for the principal’s optimal mechanism. Proposition 5.2
allows us then to check when the solution to the program in Section 4 is also a
solution to the problem in which the principal observes the agent’s choice out of a
menu.
Proposition 5.2 is silent about whether the transfer scheme t1 collects the same
revenue as the original mechanism did, that is, whether t1 also satisfies thatÿ
vPV
βpµ|vqt1pµq “
ÿ
vPV
βpµ|vqtpµq, (DIC-T)
for all µ such that
ř
vPV βpµ|vq ą 0.
Contrary to Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992), we do not find that once
(DIC-P) is satisfied, then (DIC-T) is satisfied. In particular, with two types,
only when the solution features two beliefs, µpv2q ă µ0 ă µpv2q “ 1, can one
satisfy both (DIC-P) and (DIC-T). We leave for future research the full analysis
of the conditions under which both (DIC-P) and (DIC-T) hold.28
28Note that Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992), Manelli and Vincent (2010), Gershkov et al.
(2013) use the representation of the agent’s utility function obtained via the envelope theorem to
pin down transfers. As discussed in Section 4, we cannot guarantee downward-looking constraints
bind at the optimum when there are three or more types.
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5.3 Multiple agents: Example in Bester and Strausz (2000)
Bester and Strausz (2000) show that, with multiple agents, the result for the single-
agent case in Bester and Strausz (2001) no longer holds. That is, if M “ S and β is
deterministic, then there are equilibria with mechanisms in which M ‰ V , whose
payoffs cannot be replicated with canonical mechanisms. To keep the discussion
self-contained, we replicate here their example and then explain why it does not
invalidate the possibility of extending our techniques to the multi-agent case.
Example 1 (Bester and Strausz (2000)). There are two agents, labeled 1 and 2.
Only agent 1 has private information; let v P tv, vu denote her type. The prior
that the type is v is denoted by µ P r0, 1s. The set of allocations A “ r0, 2s. Payoffs
are defined as follows:
W pa, vq “ ´a2,W pa, vq “ ´p2´ aq2
U1pa, vq “ ´p0.5´ aq2, U1pa, vq “ ´p1.5´ aq2
U2paq “ ´10p1´ aq2.
That is, the principal’s payoff depends on agent 1’s type, whereas agent 2’s payoff
does not.
The timing is as follows. The principal selects a communication device for
the agents, who then submit messages. Upon seeing the messages, the principal
chooses a P A.
The principal’s payoffs are such that if, after seeing m, his posterior is µpmq,
then he chooses allocation
a˚pmq “ 2p1´ µpmqq.
Bester and Strausz (2000) construct an equilibrium with three messages tma,mb,mcu
that cannot be replicated with messages tv, vu. Let M “ tma,mb,mcu. Then there
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is a PBE such that
µpmaq “ 1, µpmbq “ 1{2, µpmcq “ 0
a˚pmaq “ 0, a˚pmbq “ 1, a˚pmcq “ 2.
However, the above mechanism cannot be replicated by a mechanism with two
messages, when the principal observes the output messages. The reason is not that
agent 1 is not indifferent between the allocations he obtains at different messages,
so that he is not willing to carry out the randomization himself. Rather, under the
assumptions of Bester and Strausz (2001), the mechanism can only have as many
input messages as output messages. Because the agent may be of one of two types,
the mechanism can only have two input messages. Therefore, the agent does not
have enough room to do the mixing and generate the required posteriors for the
principal.
However, if we allow the principal to offer canonical mechanisms as the ones in
this paper, the following communication device implements the same allocation as
the non-canonical mechanism:
βpµpmaq|vq “ 1{2, βpµpmaq|vq “ 0,
βpµpmbq|vq “ 1{2, βpµpmbq|vq “ 1{2,
βpµpmcq|vq “ 0, βpµpmcq|vq “ 1{2.
After all, the result that taking M » V and S » ∆pV q is without loss of generality
dispenses with the restriction that the number of input messages must coincide
with the number of output messages.
Extending the model in Section 2 to the case of multiple agents involves dealing
with a number of subtleties that merit a full separate study and are thus beyond
the scope of this paper. We plan to address this important extension in future
research.
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A Proof of preliminary results
Appendix A is organized as follows:
Proposition A.1 shows we can focus without loss of generality on equilibria of the game
in which the agent does not condition her strategy on the payoff-irrelevant part of her
private history.
Proposition A.2 shows we can focus without loss of generality on equilibria of the game
in which the agent participates with probability one.
Proposition A.3 shows we can focus without loss of generality on equilibria in which
there is a one-to-one mapping between the output messages generated in the mechanism
and the continuation beliefs the principal holds about the agent’s type.
Because we have to deal with an abstract dynamic game, the proof is notationally
involved. As a first pass to most results, except Proposition A.1, the reader is invited to
first take a look at Appendix I in the supplementary material, where the constructions
are performed in a two-period version of the model.
We need a few more pieces of notation and definitions.
First, as noted in footnote 11, some output messages can never be observed. Given a
mechanism, Mt, define S
˚Mt “ ts P SMt : pDm P MMtqβMtps|mq ą 0u. Since removing
public histories from the tree that are consistent with mechanism Mt and s P SMtzS˚Mt
does not change the set of equilibrium outcomes, hereafter, these histories are removed
from the tree.
Second, fix a PBE of the dynamic mechanism-selection game xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y and a
public history ht for some t ě 0 (if t “ 0, then h0 “ H denotes the initial public history).
For T ě t, the history hT “ pht,Mt, pt, st, at, . . . ,MT´1, pT´1, sT´1, aT´1, ωT q is on the
path of the equilibrium strategy profile given ht if for all t ď τ ď T ´ 1
hτ`1 “ phτ ,Mτ , pτ , sτ , aτ , ωτ`1q,
41
where
Mτ P supp Γ˚phτ qÿ
pv,hτAq
µ˚phτ qpv, hτAqpi˚v phτA,Mτ qppτ q ą 0
pτ “ 1 ñ
ÿ
pv,hτAq:piv˚ phτA,Mτ qą0
µ˚phτ qpv, hτAq
ÿ
mPMMτ
r˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmqβMτ psτ |mqαMτ paτ |sτ q ą 0
pτ “ 0 ñ sτ “ H, aτ “ a˚.
That is, along the path from ht to hτ`1, the principal made choices according to his
equilibrium strategy, the agent made participation choices according to her equilibrium
strategy, and the output-message labels and allocations correspond to those in the mech-
anism chosen by the principal. Note that we do not say anything about the reports of
the agent, because they are not part of the public history.
We sometimes need to talk about the histories that are on the path of the equilibrium
strategy profile given a public history ht and a mechanism Mt.The only difference with
the above definition is that Mt need not have positive probability according to Γ
˚phtq.
The above notation is used as follows. Proposition A.1 shows that for any PBE, there is
a payoff-equivalent PBE in which the agent does not condition her strategy on the payoff-
irrelevant part of her private history. To do so, starting from any history ht, we need to
modify the strategy for all continuation histories on the path of the strategy. Similarly,
the main theorem shows we can transform any PBE of the game into one in which the
principal’s strategy selects only canonical mechanisms on and off the equilibrium path.
To do so, we must map the continuation strategy starting from any history ht in the
game to one in which the continuation strategy only offers canonical mechanisms. When
we perform this mapping for h0, we are doing the transformation for the path of the
equilibrium strategy; when we do this for histories that can be reached from ht, we are
doing the transformation for the path of the continuation strategy.
Proposition A.1. Fix a PBE xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y and a public history ht. Then, there
exists a continuation strategy for the agent ppi˚˚v , r˚˚v qvPV such that:
1. For any mechanism Mt, for all h
t
A, h
t
A
1 P H tAphtq, and for all v P V , pi˚˚v phtA,Mtq “
pi˚˚v phtA1,Mtq and r˚˚v phtA,Mt, 1q “ r˚˚v phtA1,Mt, 1q.
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2. For all mechanisms Mt, for τ ě t ` 1, for all histories hτ on the equilibrium path
starting from pht,Mtq, for all hτA, hτA1 P HτAphτ q, for all Mτ P supp Γ˚phτ q, and for
all v P V pi˚˚v phτA,Mτ q “ pi˚˚v phτA1,Mτ q and r˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1q “ r˚˚v phτA1,Mτ , 1q.
3. For all histories hτ on the equilibrium path starting from ht, the continuation payoff
for the principal at pΓ˚, ppi˚˚v , r˚˚v qvPV , µ˚q is the same as at pΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚q;
similarly, for each v P V and each hτA P HτAphτ q the continuation payoff for the
agent at pv, hτAq is the same under both strategy profiles.
4. pΓ˚, ppi˚˚v , r˚˚v qvPV , µ˚q is also a PBE.
Proof. Fix a PBE xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y. Let ht be a public history such that there exists
Mt, h
t
A, h
1t
A, both consistent with h
t, and v P V such that either piv˚ phtA,Mtq ‰ piv˚ phtA1,Mtq
or rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1q ‰ rvph1tA,Mt, 1q.
Note that for each m P MMt , the agent’s continuation payoff at pv, htAq and pv, htA1q
must be the same: after all, the continuation strategy of pv, htAq is feasible for pv, h1tAq and
vice versa. Therefore, the agent at pv, htAq is not only indifferent between all the messages
in the support of rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1q, but is also indifferent between all messages in the support
of rv˚ ph1tA,Mt, 1q. Therefore, the agent at pv, htAq is indifferent between rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1q and
any randomization between rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1q and rv˚ ph1tA,Mt, 1q.
Moreover, the above is true for any continuation public history that is reached with
positive probability from ht for the same reasons. That is, for any τ ě t and hτ that
succeeds pht,Mtq along which the principal follows Γ˚ and the agent at pv, htAq and
at pv, h1tAq follows piv˚ , rv˚ and for any hτA, h1τA that succeed htA and h1tA, respectively, the
agent is indifferent between her reporting strategy rv˚ phτA,Mτ , 1q and rv˚ ph1τA ,Mτ , 1q for
Mτ P Γ˚phτ q.
Therefore, starting from ht, the following is also an optimal strategy for the agent when
her valuation is v. Consider first those types v for which
ř
htAPHtAphtq µ
˚phtqpv, htAq ą 0.
For any htA P H tAphtq, she participates with probability
pi˚˚v phtA,Mtq “
ÿ
htA
1
µ˚phtqpv, htA1qřĂhtAPHtAphtq µ˚phtqpv,ĂhtAqpi
˚
v phtA1,Mtq,
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and reports m PMMt with probability:
r˚˚v phtA,Mt, 1qpmq “
ÿ
htA
1PHtAphtq
µ˚phtqpv, htA1qpiv˚ phtA1,MtqřĂhtAPHtAphtq µ˚phtqpv,ĂhtAqpiv˚ pĂhtA,Mtqr
˚
v phtA1,Mt, 1qpmq,
as long as
řĂhtAPHtAphtq µ˚phtqpv,ĂhtAqpiv˚ pĂhtA,Mtq ą 0.29 For each hτ that has positive proba-
bility from pht,Mtq and hτA P HτAphτ q, for each Mτ P supp Γ˚phτ q, the agent participates
with probability
pi˚˚v phτA,Mτ q “
ÿ
hτA
1PHτAphτ q
µ˚phτ qpv, hτA1qřĂhτAPHτAphτ q µ˚phτ qpv,ĂhτAqpi
˚
v phτA1,Mτ q, (5)
as long as
řĂhτAPHτAphτ q µ˚phτ qpv,ĂhτAq ą 0 and reports m PMMτ with probability
r˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmq “
ÿ
hτA
1PHτAphτ q
µ˚phτ qpv, hτA1qpiv˚ phτA1,Mτ qř
h¯τAPHτAphτ q µ
˚phτ qpv, h¯τAqpiv˚ pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚v phτA1,Mτ , 1qpmq,
(6)
as long as
ř
h¯τAPHτAphτ q µ
˚phτ qpv, h¯τAqpiv˚ pĂhτA,Mτ q ą 0.
Before dealing with the zero probability events, note that the above transformation can
be applied to all pv, htAq, htA P H tAphtq, regardless of whether µ˚phtqpv, htAq ą 0. This is
because sequential rationality applies to all information sets of the agent and, thus, to all
htA P H tAphtq. A consequence of the above transformation is that as long as the principal
assigns positive probability to the event that the agent’s type is v P V , the agent plays
the same at all of her payoff-irrelevant histories; even at those to which the principal
assigns zero probability.
Now consider those types v P V such that řhtAPHtAphtq µ˚phtqpv, htAq “ 0. For any
29Recall we are applying this transformation only at histories that are on the equilibrium strategy
given ht. Hence, if
řĄhtAPHtAphtq µ˚phtqpv,ĂhtAqpiv˚ pĂhtA,Mtq “ 0, we continue doing the transformation at
ht`1 “ pht,Mt, 0,H, a˚q. Remark A.1 discusses how in this case we can apply a similar construction
starting from history pht,Mt, 1q.
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htA P H tAphtq, she participates with probability
pi˚˚v phtA,Mtq “
ÿ
htA
1
piv˚ phtA1,Mtq
|H tAphtAq|
,
Suppose that pht,Mt, 1q has positive probability conditional on the principal offering
Mt. Then, modify the agent’s reporting strategy so that she reports m P MMt with
probability:
r˚˚v phtA,Mt, 1qpmq “
ÿ
htA
1PHtAphtq
piv˚ phtA1,MtqřĂhtAPHtAphtq piv˚ pĂhtA,Mtqr
˚
v phtA1,Mt, 1qpmq,
if
řĂhtAPHtAphtq piv˚ pĂhtA,Mtq ą 0 and with probability
r˚˚v phtA,Mt, 1qpmq “
ÿ
htA
1PHtAphtq
rv˚ phtA1,Mt, 1qpmq
|H tAphtq|
,
otherwise.
For each hτ that has positive probability from pht,Mtq and hτA P HτAphτ q, for each
Mτ P supp Γ˚phτ q, the agent participates with probability
pi˚˚v phτA,Mτ q “
ÿ
hτA
1PHτAphτ q
piv˚ phτA1,Mτ q
|HτAphτ q|
. (7)
If the principal assigns positive probability to phτ ,Mτ , 1q at hτ , then modify the agent’s
reporting strategy so that she reports m PMMτ with probability
r˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmq “
ÿ
hτA
1PHτAphτ q
piv˚ phτA1,Mτ qř
h¯τAPHτAphτ q piv˚ pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚v phτA1,Mτ , 1qpmq, (8)
if
ř
h¯τAPHτAphτ q piv˚ pĂhτA,Mτ q ą 0 and with probability
r˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmq “
ÿ
hτA
1PHτAphtq
rv˚ phτA1,Mτ , 1qpmq
|HτAphτ q|
,
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otherwise. Thus, for those valuations v P V to which the principal assigns 0 probability–
either at ht or at a continuation history hτ on the equilibrium path of the strategy given
ht– their strategies also do not depend on the payoff-irrelevant part of the private history.
Fix τ ě t. Under the new strategy, the principal’s beliefs that the agent is of type v
and her private history is hτ`1A at history hτ`1 “ phτ ,Mτ , 1, sτ , aτ q, Mτ P supp Γ˚phτ q
are given by:
µ˚˚phτ`1qpv, hτ`1A q “
µ˚˚phτ qpv, hτAqpiv˚ phτA,Mτ qr˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmτ qβMτ psτ |mτ qř
v˜,ĂhτA
ř
m˜τ
µ˚˚pv˜,ĂhτAqpi˚˚v˜ pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚˚v˜ pĂhτA,Mτ , 1qpm˜τ qβMτ psτ |m˜τ q ,
(9)
where µ˚˚phtqpv, htAq “ µ˚phtqpv, htAq and at history hτ`1 “ phτ ,Mτ , 0, sτ , aτ q, Mτ P
supp Γ˚phτ q are given by:
µ˚˚phτ`1qpv, hτ`1A q “
µ˚˚phτ qpv, hτAqp1´ pi˚˚v phτA,Mτ qqř
v˜,ĂhτA µ˚˚phτ qpv˜,ĂhτAqp1´ pi˚˚v˜ pĂhτA,Mτ qq , (10)
We now show by induction that for any τ ě t,ÿ
hτ`1A PHτ`1A phτ`1q
µ˚˚phτ`1qpv, hτ`1A q “
ÿ
hτ`1A PHτ`1A phτ`1q
µ˚phτ`1qpv, hτ`1A q.
We do so for histories hτ that are consistent with the equilibrium strategy for which the
agent participates; it is immediate that the same holds for those histories in which she
does not.
For τ “ t and ht`1 “ pht,Mt, 1, st, atq, note the denominator on the right-hand side of
equation (9) can be written as:ÿ
v˜,htA
ÿ
mPMMt
µ˚phtqpv˜, htAqpi˚˚v˜ phtA,Mtqr˚˚v˜ phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtps|mq
“
ÿ
v˜
ÿ
mPMMt
pi˚˚v˜ phtA,Mtqr˚˚v˜ phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtps|mq
ÿ
htA
µ˚phtqpv˜, htAq
“
ÿ
v˜,htA
ÿ
mPMMt
µ˚phtqpv˜, htAqpi˚v˜ phtA,Mtqr˚v˜ phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtps|mq,
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where the first equality uses that pi˚˚v , r˚˚v does not depend on htA and the second equality
uses the definition of pi˚˚v , r˚˚v ; see equations (7) and (8). Note the last expression is
the denominator in µ˚pht`1qpv, ht`1A q. Therefore, for ht`1 “ pht,Mt, 1, st, atq, ht`1A “
phtA,Mt, 1,mt, st, atq, htA P H tAphtq
ÿ
htA
µ˚˚pht`1qpv, ht`1A q “
ř
htA
µ˚phtqpv, htAqpi˚˚v phtA,Mtqr˚˚v phtA,Mt, 1qpmtqβMtpst|mtqř
v˜,ĂhtA
ř
mPMMt µ˚phtqpv˜,ĂhtAqpi˚˚v˜ pĂhtA,Mtqr˚˚v˜ pĂhtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtpst|mq
“ pi
˚˚
v phtA,Mtqr˚˚v phtA,Mt, 1qpmtqβMtpst|mtq
ř
htA
µ˚phtqpv, htAqř
v˜,ĂhtA
ř
mPMMt µ˚phtqpv˜,ĂhtAqpi˚˚v˜ pĂhtA,Mt, 1qr˚˚v˜ pĂhtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtpst|mq
“
ř
htA
µ˚phtqpv, htAqpiv˚ phtA,Mtqrv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpmtqβMtpst|mtqř
v˜,ĂhtA
ř
mPMMt µ˚phtqpv˜,ĂhtAqpi˚˚v˜ pĂhtA,Mtqr˚˚v˜ pĂhtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtpst|mq
“
ř
htA
µ˚phtqpv, htAqpiv˚ phtA,Mtqrv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpmtqβMtpst|mtqř
v˜,ĂhtA
ř
mPMMt µ˚phtqpv˜,ĂhtAqpi˚˜v pĂhtA,Mtqr˚˜v pĂhtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtpst|mq
“
ÿ
htA
µ˚pht`1qpv, ht`1A q,
where the second equality uses that pi˚˚v , r˚˚v do not depend on htA, the third equality uses
the definition of pi˚˚v , r˚˚v , the fourth equality uses the observation about the denominator,
and the last equality follows by definition of µ˚pht`1q. Adding up both sides of the
expression over mt delivers the desired expression.
Now suppose we have established the above claim for each τ 1 ă τ . We now show
that it holds to τ 1 “ τ . To see that it holds for τ 1 “ τ , note the probability of hτ`1 “
phτ ,Mτ , 1, sτ q conditional on hτ , which is given by the denominator on the right hand
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side of equation (9), can be written as:ÿ
v˜,ĂhτA
ÿ
m˜τ
µ˚˚pv˜,ĂhτAqpi˚˚v˜ pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚˚v˜ pĂhτA,Mτ , 1qpm˜τ qβMτ psτ |m˜τ q
“
ÿ
v˜
ÿ
m˜τ
pi˚˚v˜ pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚˚v pĂhτA,Mτ , 1qpm˜τ qÿĂhτA µ
˚˚pv˜,ĂhτAqβMτ psτ |m˜τ q
“
ÿ
v˜
ÿ
m˜τ
pi˚˚v pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚˚v pĂhτA,Mτ , 1qpm˜τ qÿĂhτA µ
˚pv˜,ĂhτAqβMτ psτ |m˜τ q
“
ÿ
v˜,ĂhτA
ÿ
m˜τ
µ˚pv˜,ĂhτAqpi˚v pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚v pĂhτA,Mτ , 1qpm˜τ qβMτ psτ |m˜τ q,
where the second equality makes use of the inductive hypothesis for τ 1 “ τ´1, řĂhτA µ˚˚phτ qpv˜,ĂhτAq “řĂhτA µ˚phτ qpv˜,ĂhτAq, and the third equality uses the definition of the participation and re-
porting strategies defined in equations (7) and (8). Note the last line corresponds to the
expression of the denominator of µ˚phτ`1qpv, hτ`1A q in the original PBE.
Therefore,
ÿ
hτA
µ˚˚phτ`1qpv, hτ`1A q “
ř
hτA
µ˚˚phτ qpv, hτAqpi˚˚v phτA,Mτ qr˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmτ qβMτ psτ |mτ qř
v˜,ĂhτA
ř
m˜τ
µ˚phτ qpv˜,ĂhτAqpi˚˜v pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚˜v pĂhτA,Mτ , 1qpm˜τ qβMτ psτ |m˜τ q
“ pi
˚˚
v phτA,Mτ qr˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmτ qβMτ psτ |mτ q
ř
hτA
µ˚˚phτ qpv, hτAqř
v˜,ĂhτA
ř
m˜τ
µ˚phτ qpv˜,ĂhτAqpi˚˜v pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚˜v pĂhτA,Mτ , 1qpm˜τ qβMτ psτ |m˜τ q
“ pi
˚˚
v phτA,Mτ qr˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmτ qβMτ psτ |mτ q
ř
hτA
µ˚phτ qpv, hτAqř
v˜,ĂhτA
ř
m˜τ
µ˚phτ qpv˜,ĂhτAqpi˚˜v pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚˜v pĂhτA,Mτ , 1qpm˜τ qβMτ psτ |m˜τ q
“
ř
hτA
µ˚phτ qpv, hτAqpiv˚ phτA,Mτ qrv˚ phτA,Mτ , 1qpmτ qβMτ psτ |mτ qř
v˜,ĂhτA
ř
m˜τ
µ˚phτ qpv˜,ĂhτAqpi˚˜v pĂhτA,Mτ qr˚˜v pĂhτA,Mτ , 1qpm˜τ qβMτ psτ |m˜τ q
“
ÿ
hτA
µ˚phτ`1qpv, hτ`1A q,
where the first equality makes use of our conclusion for the denominator, the second
equality uses that pi˚˚v , r˚˚v do not depend on hτA, the third equality makes use of the
inductive hypothesis, the fourth equality makes use of equations (7) and (8), and the
fifth equality follows from the definition of the beliefs via Bayes’ rule. Adding up the
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above expression over mτ delivers the desired conclusion.
We now use the above properties to show the payoffs of the principal do not change along
the path that starts from ht. Fix any history hτ that is on the path of the equilibrium
strategy starting from ht. The principal’s payoffs are given by:ÿ
pv,hτAq
µ˚˚phτ qpv, hτAq
!
p1´ pi˚˚v pv, hτAqqEΓ˚,pi˚˚v ,r˚˚v
“
W paphτ q, a˚, aěτ`1q|v, hτA,Mτ , 0
‰ ` pi˚˚v phτA,Mτ qˆ
ÿ
mPMMτ
r˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmq
ÿ
sPSMτ
βMτ ps|mqEΓ˚,pi˚˚v ,r˚˚v “W paphτ q, as, aěτ`1, vq|v, hτA, 1,m, s‰
+
“
ÿ
v
$&%p1´ pi˚˚v phτA,Mτ qqÿ
hτA
µ˚˚phτ qpv, hτAqEΓ˚,pi˚˚v ,r˚˚v
“
W paphτ q, a˚, aěτ`1q|v, hτA,Mτ , 0
‰` pi˚˚v phτA,Mτ qˆ
ÿ
mPMMτ
r˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmq
ÿ
hτA
µ˚˚phτ qpv, hτAq
ÿ
sPSMτ
βMτ ps|mqEΓ˚,pi˚˚v ,r˚˚v “W paphτ q, as, aěτ`1, vq|v, hτA, 1,m, s‰
,.-
“
ÿ
v
$&%p1´ piv˚ phτA,Mτ qqÿ
hτA
µ˚phτ qpv, hτAqEΓ˚,pi˚˚v ,r˚˚v
“
W paphτ q, a˚, aěτ`1q|v, hτA,Mτ , 0
‰` pi˚˚v phτA,Mτ qˆ
ÿ
mPMMτ
r˚˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmq
ÿ
hτA
µ˚phτ qpv, hτAq
ÿ
sPSMτ
βMτ ps|mqEΓ˚,pi˚˚v ,r˚˚v “W paphτ q, as, aěτ`1, vq|v, hτA, 1,m, s‰
,.-
“
ÿ
pv,hτAq
µ˚phτ qpv, hτAq
!
p1´ piv˚ pv, hτAqqEΓ˚,pi˚˚v ,r˚˚v
“
W paphτ q, a˚, aěτ`1q|v, hτA,Mτ , 0
‰
` piv˚ phτA,Mτ q ˆ
ÿ
mPMMτ
rv˚ phτA,Mτ , 1qpmq
ÿ
sPSMτ
βMτ ps|mqEΓ˚,pi˚˚v ,r˚˚v “W paphτ q, as, aěτ`1, vq|v, hτA, 1,m, s‰
+
“
ÿ
pv,hτAq
µ˚phτ qpv, hτAq
!
p1´ piv˚ pv, hτAqqEΓ˚,piv˚ ,rv˚
“
W paphτ q, a˚, aěτ`1q|v, hτA,Mτ , 0
‰
` piv˚ phτA,Mτ q ˆ
ÿ
mPMMτ
rv˚ phτA,Mτ , 1qpmq
ÿ
sPSMτ
βMτ ps|mqEΓ˚,piv˚ ,rv˚ “W paphτ q, as, aěτ`1, vq|v, hτA, 1,m, s‰
+
,
where the first equality follows from noting that the agent’s strategy does not depend on
hτA, the second equality follows from the previous result and noting that under pi
˚˚
v , r
˚˚
v ,
the continuation strategy does not depend on hτA, the third equality follows from the
definition of the strategy, and the last equality follows from noting this equality holds
after every history on the path of the equilibrium strategy starting from ht.
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Remark A.1. Suppose that at history ht and after offering Mt, the principal assigns
probability 0 to the agent participating. In that case, his beliefs µ˚pht,Mt, 1q P ∆pV ˆ
H tApht,Mt, 1qq are not determined by Bayes’ rule. It is immediate to extend the proof
of Proposition A.1 to show that starting from pht,Mt, 1q, we can modify the agent’s
strategy along the path of the equilibrium strategy so that she does not condition on her
payoff-irrelevant private history.
Remark A.2. The payoff-equivalent PBE assessment one obtains from Proposition A.1
satisfies the following property. On the equilibrium path, the principal’s beliefs over the
agent’s payoff-relevant type, v P V , do not depend on her payoff-irrelevant history, htA.
That is, for any public history on the equilibrium path of the strategy profile given the
initial history, for any v P V , htA, htA1 P H tAphtq such that µ˚phtqpv, htAq, µ˚phtqpv, htA1q ą 0,
we have µ˚phtqpv, htAq “ µ˚phtqpv, htA1q.
However, at a public history ht reached after a deviation by the agent, either because she
changes her participation strategy in a detectable way or because she triggers an output
message that was not supposed to be triggered according to the equilibrium strategy,
the requirements of PBE do not rule out that the principal’s updated beliefs depend
non-trivially on both v and htA.
However, it follows from Proposition A.1 that without loss of generality, we can assume
that when the principal observes a deviation by the agent, his updated beliefs do not
depend on htA. After all, the agent’s behavior after the deviation does not depend on his
payoff irrelevant private history and the principal cannot offer mechanisms as a function of
htA. We record this in Corollary A.1 below and prove it in Section II of the supplementary
material.
Corollary A.1. Fix a PBE, xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y. Then, without loss of generality,
for any t, public history ht, v P V and private histories htA, htA1 P H tAphtq such that
µ˚phtqpv, htAq, µ˚phtqpv, htA1q ą 0,
µ˚phtqpv, htAq “ µ˚phtqpv, htA1q.
Remark A.3. Note that the corollary states that equality holds only for pv, htAq, pv, htA1q
that have positive probability given the equilibrium beliefs, because the agent’s strategy
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may assign probability 0 to some input messages and hence some htA’s cannot be given
positive probability.
Hereafter, we focus on equilibria in which the agent’s strategy does not depend on the
payoff-irrelevant part of her private history.
We introduce one final piece of notation. Given a strategy profile pΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV q and
a history ht, denote the continuation strategy starting at ht implied by this profile as
pΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV q
ˇˇ
ht
.
The next result shows that without loss of generality, we can focus on equilibria in
which the agent participates with probability 1:
Proposition A.2. Fix a PBE, xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y. Then, there is a PBE, xΓ˚˚, ppi˚˚v , r˚˚v qvPV , µ˚˚y
where
1. For every t ě 0, for every v P V , for every htA, pi˚˚v phtA,Mtq “ 1 for all Mt P
supp Γ˚˚phtq.
2. The principal and the agent’s payoffs are the same after every history as in xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y.
3. For every t and public history ht, the distribution over allocations is the same as in
xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y.
Proof. Fix t and ht such that there exists Mt P supp Γ˚phtq such that piv˚ phtA,Mtq ă
1. Recall MMt is a finite set and SMt contains ∆pMMtq. Recall that for all m P
MMt , βMtp¨|mq P ∆˚pSMtq has finite support. Then there exists s˚ P SMt such that
βMtps˚|mq “ 0 for all m PMMt .
Let V1 “ tv P V : piv˚ phtA,Mtq ą 0u “ tv1, ..., v|V1|u. Since |V | ď |MMt |, we can label the
latter set MMt “ tm1, ....,m|V1|, ...,m|MMt |u. Modify βMt as follows. For i “ 1, . . . , |V1|,
let
rβps|miq “ ÿ
mPMMt
βMtps|mqr˚viphtA,Mt, 1qpmq.
Note that rβ does not depend on htA since rv˚i does not depend on htA.
If |V1| ă |MMt |, let rβps˚|miq “ 1 for all i ą |V1| and let α˜ps˚q “ δa˚ . Modify the
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strategies so that the principal, instead of offering Mt, offers ĂMt “ txMMt , rβ, SMty, rαu
r˚˚vi phtA,Mt, 1qpmq “
$’&’%
piv˚iphtA,Mtq if m “ mi
p1´ piv˚iphtA,Mtqq if m “ m|V1|`1
0 otherwise
and let pΓ˚˚, ppi˚˚v , r˚˚v qvPV q
ˇˇ
pht,M˜t,1,s˚q “ pΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV q
ˇˇ
pht,Mt,0q, for all other s P SMt , let
pΓ˚˚, ppi˚˚v , r˚˚v qvPV q
ˇˇ
pht,M˜t,1,sq “ pΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV q
ˇˇ
pht,Mt,1,sq.
If |V1| “ |MMt | (which implies that V1 “ V ), modify rβ once more so that:
˜˜βps|miq “
#
piv˚iphtA,Mtqβ˜ps|miq if s ‰ s˚
p1´ piv˚iphtA,Mtqq otherwise
,
and let α˜ps˚q “ δa˚ as before. Modify the strategies so that the principal, instead of
offering Mt, offers ĂMt “ txMMt , rrβ, SMty, rαu
r˚˚vi phtA,Mt, 1qpmq “ 1rm “ mis,
and let pΓ˚˚, ppi˚˚v , r˚˚v qvPV q
ˇˇ
pht,M˜t,1,s˚q “ pΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV q
ˇˇ
pht,Mt,0q, for all other s P SMt , let
pΓ˚˚, ppi˚˚v , r˚˚v qvPV q
ˇˇ
pht,M˜t,1,sq “ pΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV q
ˇˇ
pht,Mt,1,sq.
It follows immediately that the principal’s and the agent’s payoffs remain the same and
we have not changed the distribution over allocations at any history starting from ht.
Remark A.4. To keep things simple, the proof of Proposition A.2 uses the restriction
that βMt has finite support and SMt is a large set to add an output message that allows
the principal to
1. replicate the agent’s non-participation decision and,
2. make it incentive compatible for him to offer the same continuation upon observing
a˚ as he was offering before.
One can write an albeit more notationally involved proof that (i) does not rely on
the existence of an output message that is never sent and (ii) respects the one-to-one
mapping between posteriors and output messages. This alternative proof is available
from the authors upon request.
52
Proposition A.3. Fix a PBE, xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y that satisfies the properties of Propo-
sitions A.1 and A.2. Then, without loss of generality, there is a one-to-one map between
output messages and continuation beliefs. That is, for every t, public history ht, Mt P
supp Γ˚phtq, if st, s1t P S˚Mt is such that st ‰ s1t, then µ˚pht,Mt, 1, stq ‰ µ˚pht,Mt, 1, s1tq.
Lemma A.1 is used to prove Proposition A.3:
Lemma A.1. Fix a PBE assessment, xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y, that satisfies the properties
of Proposition A.1 and A.2. Then, there is another assessment xΓ˚˚, ppi˚˚v , r˚˚v qvPV , µ˚˚y
that satisfies the properties of Proposition A.1 and the following holds:
1. For all ht, for all Mt P supp Γ˚˚phtq, pi˚˚v phtA,Mtq “ 1 for all v P V such thatř
htA
µ˚phtqpv, htAq ą 0.
2. For all ht, for all Mt P supp Γ˚˚phtq, if s P S˚Mt , thenÿ
pv,htAq,mPMMt
µ˚˚phtqpv, htAqr˚˚v phtA,MtqpmqβMtps|mq ą 0.
3. For all ht, the principal’s continuation payoff remains the same and he faces the
same distribution over allocations at each continuation history on the path of the
equilibrium strategy given ht. The same holds for the agent for each of her types
v P V which have positive probability at ht.
Among other things, Lemma A.1 guarantees that if the principal’s strategy specifies
that mechanism Mt is played at history h
t, then any output message s P S˚Mt p” ts P
SMt : pDm PMMtqβMtps|mq ą 0uq has positive probability under the equilibrium strategy
profile. Thus, the principal is never surprised by the output messages he observes.
Proof of Lemma A.1. Consider a PBE assessment, xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y, that satisfies the
properties of Propositions A.1 and A.2. Suppose there exists a history ht and a type v P V
to which the principal assigns probability 0. That is,
ř
htAPHtAphtAq µ
˚phtqpv, htAq “ 0. Let
Mt P supp Γ˚phtq. LetM`Mt “ tm PMMt : řpv˜,ĂhtAqPVˆHtAphtq µ˚phtqpv˜,ĂhtAqrv˜pĂhtA,Mt, 1qpmq ą
0u. If MMtzM`Mt ‰ H, note that we can do the following transformation without up-
setting the equilibrium:
First, replace Mt by M
1
t “ pxβM1t ,MM1t , SM1ty, αM1tq where MM1t “ MMt , SM1t “
53
SMt , αM
1
t “ αMt and βM1tp¨|mq “ βMtp¨|mq for m PM`Mt and otherwise, let βM1tp¨|mq “
βMtp¨|m`q for some m` PM`Mt . Modify the principal’s strategy at ht so that instead of
offering Mt, he offers M
1
t; that is, let Γ
˚˚phtqpM1tq “ Γ˚phtqpMtq
Second, modify continuation strategies so that pΓ˚˚, ppi˚˚v , r˚˚v qvPV q|pht,M1t,1,st,atq “ pΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV q|pht,Mt,1,st,atq
for those output messages and allocations consistent with M1t.
Third, modify the agent’s strategy as follows. For v1 P V such thatř
htAPHtAphtq µ
˚phtqpv1, htAq ą 0, let pi˚˚v1 phtA,M1tq “ piv˚1phtA,Mtq “ 1 and r˚˚v1 phtA,M1t, 1q “
rv˚1phtA,Mt, 1q. Note that for these types we have not really modified the mechanism–in
effect, we have removed the choices they were not making and, hence, removed possible
deviations for them.
Consider now v P V such that řhtAPHtAphtq µ˚phtqpv, htAq “ 0. Set r˚˚v phtA,M1t, 1q so that
r˚˚v phtA,M1t, 1qpmq ą 0 if and only if m solves
max
mPM`Mt
ÿ
sPSMt
βMtps|mq
ÿ
aPA
αMtpm|sqEΓ˚,pi˚,r˚rUpaphtq, a, aět`1, vq|htA,Mt, 1,m, s, as,
where we are using that M1t is only relabeling the input messages and the continuation
histories remain the same as before so that for all m PM`Mtt :ÿ
sPSM1t
βM
1
tps|mq
ÿ
aPA
αM
1
tpm|sqEΓ˚˚,pi˚˚,r˚˚rUpaphtq, a, aět`1, vq|htA,M1t, 1,m, s, as
“
ÿ
sPSMt
βMtps|mq
ÿ
aPA
αMtpm|sqEΓ˚,pi˚,r˚rUpaphtq, a, aět`1, vq|htA,Mt, 1,m, s, as.
Note that the PBE assessment already specified what the agent would have done when
her type is v after she reported m P M`Mt , so we only need to choose her strategy at
phtA,M1t, 1q.
For such a type v P V , however, it may no longer be optimal to participate in the
mechanism when the principal offers M1t. Thus, set piv˚ phtA,M1tq “ 1 only if the agent’s
payoff from participating is at least the payoff from not participating. Note that since we
only made worse the mechanism at ht for the agent when her type has zero probability at
ht, this does not affect her incentives at earlier histories. Hence, this modification does
not alter the PBE, nor the payoffs or the distribution over allocations at each continuation
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history from the perspective of the principal and those types that have positive probability
at ht. It does alter the payoff and the distribution over allocations for the agent when
her type has zero probability at ht; however, this only happens at an event that has zero
probability for her given her type.
Proof of Proposition A.3. Take any ht, Mt P supp Γ˚phtq such that there exists st, s1t P
SMt with µ˚pht,Mt, 1, stq “ µ˚pht,Mt, 1, s1tq, where µ˚pht,Mt, 1, stq P ∆pVˆH t`1A pht,Mt, 1, stqq.
Note that by construction, the belief does not depend on the agent’s private history. In
what follows, we abuse notation and denote by µ the marginal distribution on the agent’s
type.
The finite support assumption implies that there is K ě 1 such that we can index the
principal’s posteriors at history pht,Mt, 1, ¨q as follows tµ1, . . . , µKu. Partition S˚Mt as
follows:
S˚
Mt “
Kď
l“1
tst P S˚Mt : µ˚pht,Mt, 1, stq “ µlu “
Kď
l“1
S˚
Mt pµlq.
Item 2 in Lemma A.1 implies that all the output messages in S˚Mt are generated with
positive probability (from the point of view of the principal).
For each l P t1, . . . , Ku, let SMtpµlq “ tsµlt,1, . . . , sµlt,Hlu.
Consider the following mechanism: M1t “ pxβM1t ,MM1t , SM1ty, αM1t , where MM1t “
MMt , SM
1
t “ SMt . For each l P t1, . . . , Ku, let
βM
1
tpsµlt,1|mq “
Hlÿ
h“1
βMtps|mq, βM1tpsµlt,h|mq “ 0 h P t2, . . . , Hlu
αM
1
tp¨|sµlt,1q “
Hlÿ
h“1
Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,hqřHl
h1“1 Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,h1q
αMtp¨|sµlt,hq,
where for h P t1, . . . , Hlu,
Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,hq “
ÿ
pv,htAq
µ˚phtqpv, htAq
ÿ
mPMMt
r˚v phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtpsµlt,h|mq,
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where we are using that µ˚phtqpv, htAq ą 0 implies that the agent participates with prob-
ability 1.
Modify the continuation strategies as follows:
First, for those types v P V such that řhtA µ˚phtqpv, htAq ą 0, let piv˚ phtA,M1tq “
piv˚ phtA,Mtq “ 1 and rv˚ phtA,M1t, 1q “ rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1q. Because the original strategies do
not depend on htA beyond h
t, the new strategies inherit this feature. We modify the
participation and reporting strategy of the types that have zero probability at ht at the
end since their strategies do not matter for the principal’s incentives.
Second, for each l P t1, . . . , Ku and each a P Aphtq such that řHlh“1 αMtpa|sµlt,hq ą 0,
partition r0, 1s “ YHl´1h“0 rωah, ωah`1q, where ωa0 “ 0, ωaHl “ 1 and for h “ 1, ..., Hl:
ωah ´ ωah´1 “
Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,hqαMtpa|sµlt,hqřHl
h1“1 Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,h1qαMtpa|sµlt,h1q
.
Fix any a P supp αM1tp¨|s1t,µq. Then, for ω P rωah´1, ωahq, h ě 1, let
pΓ˚, ppi˚v , r˚v qvPV q
∣∣∣∣
pht,M1t,sµlt,1,a,ωq
“ pΓ˚, ppi˚v , r˚v qvPV q
∣∣∣∣
pht,Mt,sµlt,h,a,
ω´ωa
h´1
ωa
h
´ωa
h´1
q
.
That is we append to history pht,M1t, 1, sµlt,1, a, ωq, the continuation strategy that corre-
sponds to pht,Mt, 1, sµlt,h, a, ω´ωh´1ωh´ωh´1 q.
This clearly guarantees that the principal’s payoff is the same, that he updates to µl
after observing sµlt,1 for l P t1, . . . , Ku, and that the continuation strategies are indeed
sequentially rational for the principal. Next we show that payoffs remain the same for
those types of the agent to which the principal assigns positive probability, so that the
above strategies are sequentially rational for them.
Fix l P t1, . . . , Ku. For h P t2, . . . , Hlu, let kl1h denote the following ratio:
kl1h “
Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,hq
Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,1q .
and let kl11 “ 1. Because the principal updates to the same belief about the agent’s type
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after each s P SMtpµq, we have that for all vj P supp µ and for all h P t1, . . . , |SMtpµq|u,
ÿ
mPMMt
r˚v phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβpsµlt,h|mq “ kl1h
« ÿ
mPMMt
r˚v phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβpsµlt,1|mq
ff
.
The above expression implies that we can write
αM
1
tp¨|sµlt,1q “
Hlÿ
h“1
Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,hqřHl
h1“1 Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,h1q
αMtp¨|sµlt,hq “
Hlÿ
h“1
kl1hřHl
h1“1 k
l
1h1
αMtpa|sµlt,hq,
ωah ´ ωah´1 “
Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,hqαMtpa|sµlt,hqřHl
h1“1 Prµ˚,Γ˚,pi˚,r˚psµlt,h1qαMtpa|sµlt,h1q
“ k
l
1hα
Mtpa|sµlt,hqřHl
h1“1 k
l
1h1α
Mtpa|sµlt,h1q
.
Moreover, we also have the following:
Hlÿ
h“1
ř
mPMMt rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtpsµlt,h|mqřHl
h1“1p
ř
m1PMMt rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpm1qβMtpsµlt,h1 |m1qq
αMtpa|sµlt,hq
“
Hlÿ
h“1
kl1hřHl
h1“1 k
l
1,h1
αMtpa|sµlt,hq “ αM1tpa|sµlt,1q,
andř
mPMMt rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtpsµlt,h|mqαMtpa|sµlt,hqřHl
h˜“1
ř
m˜PMMt rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpm˜qβMtpsµlt,h˜|m˜qαMtpa|sµlt,h˜q
“ k
l
1hα
Mtpa|sµlt,hqřHl
h1“1 k
µl
1h1α
Mtpa|sµlt,h1q
“ ωah ´ ωah´1.
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Thus, we can write the agent’s payoff in the original mechanism Mt as follows:ÿ
mPMMt
rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpmq
ÿ
sPSMt
βMtps|mq
ÿ
aPAphtq
αMtpa|sqErUpaphtq, a, aět`1, vq|htA,Mt, 1,m, s, as “
“
ÿ
mPMMt
rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpmq
Kÿ
l“1
Hlÿ
h“1
βMtpsµlt,h|mq
ÿ
aPAphtq
αMtpa|sµlt,hqErUpaphtq, a, aět`1, vq|htA,Mt, 1,m, sµlt,h, as
“
Kÿ
l“1
ÿ
aPAphtq
«
Hlÿ
h“1
ÿ
mPMMt
rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtpsµlt,h|mqαMtpa|sµlt,hqErUpaphtq, a, aět`1, vq|htA,Mt, 1,m, sµlt,h, as
ff
“
Kÿ
l“1
ÿ
aPAphtq
¨˝
Hlÿ
h˜“1
ÿ
m˜PMMt
rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpm˜qβMtpsµlt,h˜|m˜qαMtpa|s
µl
t,h˜
q‚˛ˆ
Hlÿ
h“1
ř
mPMMt rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtpsµlt,h|mqαMtpa|sµlt,hqřHl
h˜“1
ř
m˜PMMt rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpm˜qβMtpsµlt,h˜|m˜qαMtpa|s
µl
t,h˜
qErUpaph
tq, a, aět`1, vq|htA,Mt, 1,m, sµlt,h, as
“
Kÿ
l“1
˜
Hlÿ
h1“1
ÿ
m1PMMt
rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpm1qβ˚psµlt,h1 |m1q
¸ ÿ
aPAphtq
αM
1
tpa|sµlt,1qˆ
Hlÿ
h“1
ř
mPMMt rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpmqβMtpsµlt,h|mqαMtpa|sµlt,hqřHl
h˜“1
ř
m˜PMMt rv˚ phtA,Mt, 1qpm˜qβMtpsµlt,h˜|m˜qαMtpa|s
µl
t,h˜
qErUpaph
tq, a, aět`1, vq|htA,Mt, 1,m, sµlt,h, as
“
ÿ
mPMMt
rv˚ phtA,M1t, 1qpmq
Kÿ
l“1
βM
1
tpsµlt,1|mq
ÿ
aPAphtq
αM
1
tpa|sµlt,1q ˆ ErUpaphtq, a, aět`1, vq|htA,M1t, 1,m, sµlt,1, as,
where the first equality uses the labeling of the posteriors we have used throughout the
proof, the second equality is obtained by changing the order of summation, the third
equality is obtained by multiplying and dividing by the probability that, conditional on
the belief being µl, allocation a was obtained, the fourth equality is obtained by using
the definition of αM
1
t and grouping the terms that represent the total probability that the
output message corresponds to belief µl, and the final equality is obtained by realizing
this rewriting corresponds to the payoff the agent obtains under mechanism M1t.
Therefore, the agent’s incentives remain the same when her type has positive probability
at ht.
Finally, for those v P V such that řhtAPHtAphtq µ˚phtqpv, htAq “ 0, choose rv˚ phtA,M1t, 1q to
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solve:
max
mPMM1t
Kÿ
l“1
βM
1
tpsµlt,1|mq
ÿ
aPAphtq
αM
1
tpa|sµlt,1q ˆ EΓ˚,pi˚,r˚rUpaphtq, a, aět`1, vq|htA,M1t, 1,m, sµlt,1, as,
and use the payoff of this to calculate piv˚ phtA,M1tq.
It is immediate that with all these modifications the assessment remains a PBE.
B Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. Let xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y denote a PBE that satisfies the properties of Propositions
A.1-A.3. That is, the agent’s strategy only depends on her payoff-relevant type, v P V ,
the agent participates with probability 1 when her type has positive probability, and each
output message corresponds to exactly one posterior belief.
Fix t ě 0, a history ht, and a history hτ on the path given ht for some τ ě t. For each
Mτ P supp Γ˚phτ q, define the injective mapping:
σphτ ,Mτ q : SMτ ÞÑ ∆pV q
σphτ ,Mτ qpsq “
ÿ
hτAPHτA,mPMMτ
µ˚phτ ,Mτ , 1, sτ qp¨, hτA,mq, (11)
which is well-defined by Propositions A.1 and A.3
Using this, we can define the corresponding canonical mechanism MCτ as follows:
MCτ “ tpV, βMCτ ,∆pV qq, αMCτ u, (12)
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where30
βM
C
τ pµ|vq “
ÿ
mPMτ
βMτ pσ´1phτ ,Mτ qpµq|mqr˚v phτA,Mτ , 1qpmq, (13)
αM
C
τ pµq “ αMτ pσ´1phτ ,Mτ qpµqq. (14)
Note the construction of βM
C
τ uses the fact that the agent’s reporting strategy only
depends on her private type and not on the payoff-irrelevant part of her private history.
Having done this transformation for t ď τ 1 ď τ , we can map any history
hτ “ pht,Mt, 1, st, . . . ,Mτ , 1, sτ , aτ , ωτ q,
on the path of the equilibrium strategy starting from ht to:31
hτ
C “ pht,MCt , 1, σpht,Mtqpstq, at, . . . ,MCτ , 1, σphτ ,Mτ qpsτ q, aτ , ωτ q.
Thus, we can define the principal’s strategy so that Γ1phτC qpMCτ q “ Γ˚phτ qpMτ q.
Given hτ “ pht,Mt, 1, st, at, . . . ,Mτ , 1, sτ , aτ , ωτ q and the corresponding hτC , the set of
agent histories that is consistent with hτ
C
is given by:
Hτ
C
A phτC q “
“
#
phtA,MCt , 1, vt, σpht,Mtqpstq, at, . . . ,MCτ´1, 1, vτ´1, στ´1phτ´1,Mτ´1qpsτ´1q, aτ´1, ωτ q :
htA P H tAphtq, pvt, . . . , vτ´1q P V τ
+
.
Let pi1vphτCA ,MCτ q “ piv˚ phτA,Mτ q “ 1 and r1vphτCA ,MCτ , 1q “ δv.
Let rV ˆHτCA phτC qs˚ denote the set of truthful histories starting from ht, i.e., those that
have the agent of type v report v throughout t, . . . , τ ´ 1 conditional on her participating
30Suppose that v P V has probability 0 at history hτ . We can use the agent’s strategy profile to
construct βM
C
τ p¨|vq. A consequence of Lemma A.1 and Proposition A.3 is that the principal assigns
probability 0 to such v for all s P S˚Mτ and hence at all µ P S˚MCτ . In other words, βMCτ pµ|vq ą 0
implies that µpvq “ 0.
31Note that the agent always participates on the path of the strategy.
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in the mechanism. With this notation at hand, let:
µ1phτC qpv, hτCA q “ µ˚phτ qpvq1rpv, hτCA q P rV ˆHτCA phτC qs˚s
It remains to check that at history hτ
C
, when the principal offers MCτ P supp Γ1phτC q
and the output message is ν, his beliefs areÿ
hτA,mPMMτ
µ˚phτ ,Mτ , 1, σ´1phτ ,Mτ qpνqqp¨, hτA,mq “ ν.
Suppose that we have shown this for hτ and now we show it for hτ`1 “ phτ ,MCτ , 1, νq.
Note that the probability that the agent is of type v and reports v to the mechanism is:
µ1phτC ,MCτ , 1, νqpv, hτA,MCτ , 1, v, νq “ µ
˚phτ qpvqβMCτ pν|vqřrv µ˚phτ qprvqβMCτ pν|rvq
“ µ
˚phτ qpvqřhτAPHτAphτ qřmPMMτ rv˚ phτA,Mτ , 1qpmqβMτ pσ´1phτ ,Mτ qpνq|mqřrv µ˚phτ qprvqřh1τA PHτAphτ qřm1PMMτ r˚rv ph1τA ,Mτ , 1qpm1qβMτ pσ´1phτ ,Mτ qpνq|m1q
“
ÿ
hτAPHτAphτ q,mPMMτ
µ˚phτ qpvqrv˚ phτA,Mτ , 1qpmqβMτ pσ´1phτ ,Mτ qpνq|mqřrv µ˚phτ qprvqřh1τA PHτAphτ qřm1PMMτ r˚rv ph1τA ,Mτ , 1qpm1qβMτ pσ´1phτ ,Mτ qpνq|m1q
“
ÿ
mPMMτ
ÿ
hτA
µ˚phτ ,Mτ , 1, σ´1phτ ,Mτ qpνqqpv, hτA,mq “ µ˚phτ ,Mτ , σ´1phτ ,Mτ qpνqqpvq
“ νpvq
where the first equality uses that the agent participates with probability one and reports
her type truthfully, the second equality uses the definition of βM
C
τ in equation (13), the
third line is a rewriting of the second by taking the summation over hτA P HτA,m PMMτ
outside, the fourth is obtained by recognizing the expression within the summation is the
principal’s belief at history hτ that the agent is of type v is at history hτA and submitted
message m, conditional on the output message being σ´1phτ ,Mτ qpνq, and the final line
uses the definition of σ to arrive to the desired expression.
For any ht, any τ ě t, and any hτ that is on the path given ht, and the corresponding
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hτ
C
, if Mτ R supp Γ1phτC q, then
pi1vphτCA ,Mτ q “ pi˚v phτA,Mτ q
r1vphτCA ,Mτ , 1q “ r˚v phτA,Mτ , 1q
Note that for any m P MMτ , s P SMτ , the previous transformation will take the con-
tinuation strategy that follows phτ ,Mτ , sτ , aτ , ωτ`1q “ hτ`1 to one in which the principal
offers canonical mechanisms.
For any other histories, specify the strategies as in the original game.
Note that we have not modified the outcome of the game after any history ht; in
particular, the new strategy profile implements the path of the original profile. Moreover,
the agent does not have an incentive to lie; otherwise, she would have had a deviation
in the original profile. Additionally, the principal also has no deviations; otherwise, he
would have had an incentive to deviate in the original profile. This completes the proof
of Theorem 3.1.
C Properties of the canonical game
Proposition C.1. Fix a canonical PBE of the mechanism-selection game xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y.
Then, without loss of generality, for any public history ht, there exists a canonical mech-
anism MCt such that
1. MCt maximizes the principal’s payoff from a deviation at h
t,
2. piv˚ phtA,MCt q “ 1,
3. rv˚ phtA,MCt , 1q “ δv.
Proof. Fix a history ht and suppose that there exists a non-canonical mechanism Mt˚ that
maximizes the principal’s payoff from a deviation. Let piv˚ phtA,Mt˚ q, rv˚ phtA,Mt˚ , 1q denote
the agent’s participation and reporting strategy upon observing the principal’s choice of
Mt˚ .
We make three observations:
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1. In a canonical PBE the continuation strategy for the agent for any ht`1A “ phtA,Mt˚ , ...q
does not depend on ht`1A . (Recall the proof of Proposition A.1 does not rely on the
public history ht being on the path.)
2. Therefore, we can use the same construction as in Propositions A.2 and A.3 to
transform the mechanism and the continuation strategy to guarantee that the agent
participates with probability 1 after observing Mt˚ and each output message maps
exactly to one continuation belief. Denote by M˚˚t the transformed mechanism.
3. Finally, we can use the transformation in Theorem 3.1 to construct from M˚˚t a
canonical mechanism, MC
˚
t , in which the agent reports truthfully and the rec-
ommended beliefs for the principal are indeed the beliefs obtained via Bayesian
updating.
Note that MC
˚
t is an available choice for the principal. It follows from the previous
observations that in the original strategy profile, we can replace the best response for the
agent and the continuation strategy after the principal offers MC
˚
t by those obtained in
transforming Mt˚ to M
C˚
t . In the new strategy profile, the principal is now indifferent
between deviating to Mt˚ and to M
C˚
t .
Corollary C.1. If xΓ˚C , ppi˚Cv , r˚Cv qvPV , µ˚Cy is a canonical PBE of the canonical game,
then there is an equilibrium of the mechanism-selection game xΓ˚, ppiv˚ , rv˚ qvPV , µ˚y that
implements the same choices by the principal and the agent on the equilibrium path.
D Proofs of Section 4
D.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Compare the solution to (P) to the solution to the following program:
max
β,a,y,t
Nÿ
i“1
µ0,i
Mÿ
h“1
βi,h
ÿ
qPQ
αhpqqrwipqh, yhpqqq ` ths (A)
s.t.
$’&’%
ř
β1,hru1h ´ ths ě 0ř
hpβi,h ´ βk,hqrui,h ´ ths ě 0, p@iqp@k P ti´ 1, i` 1uq
yhpqhq P arg maxřNi“1 µ0,iβi,hwipqh, yq ,
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where ui,h is shorthand for
ř
qPQ αhpqquipqh, yhpqqq.
Theorem D.1. If ui satisfies Definition 4.1, then the values of (P) and (A) coincide.
Proof. We show that the solution to (A) satisfies all the constraints of (P). Note first
that the solution to (A) satisfies that for all i ě 2,ÿ
h
βi,hrui,h ´ ths ě
ÿ
h
βi´1,hrui,h ´ thsÿ
h
βi´1,hrui´1,h ´ ths ě
ÿ
h
βi,hrui´1,h ´ ths,
so that for all i ě 2, we haveÿ
h
pβi,h ´ βi´1,hqpui,h ´ ui´1,hq ě 0. (15)
To show that the statement of the theorem holds, consider i and j ă i ´ 1.The solution
to (A) satisfies ÿ
h
βi,hrui,h ´ ths ě
ÿ
h
βi´1,hrui,h ´ thsÿ
h
βi´1,hrui´1,h ´ ths ě
ÿ
h
βi´2,hrui´1,h ´ ths
. . .ÿ
h
βj`1,hruj`1,h ´ ths ě
ÿ
h
βj,hruj`1,h ´ ths.
Adding up, we obtain
iÿ
k“j`1
Mÿ
h“1
pβk,h ´ βk´1,hquk,h ě
ÿ
h
pβi,h ´ βj,hqth. (16)
Monotonic expectational differences together with equation (15) implies the left-hand
side is bounded above by
iÿ
k“j`1
Mÿ
h“1
pβk,h ´ βk´1,hqui,h “
Mÿ
h“1
pβi,h ´ βj,hqui,h. (17)
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Equations (16) and (17) implyÿ
h
βi,hrui,h ´ ths ě
ÿ
h
βj,hruj,h ´ ths.
Therefore, the constraint that i does not report j ă i´ 1 holds.
Similarly, consider i and j ą i` 1. The solution to (A) satisfiesÿ
h
βi,hrui,h ´ ths ě
ÿ
h
βi`1,hrui,h ´ thsÿ
h
βi`1,hrui`1,h ´ ths ě
ÿ
h
βi`2,hrui`1,h ´ ths
. . .ÿ
h
βj´1,hruj´1,h ´ ths ě
ÿ
h
βj,hruj´1,h ´ ths.
Adding up, we obtain
j´1ÿ
k“i
Mÿ
h“1
pβk,h ´ βk`1,hquk,h ě
ÿ
h
pβi,h ´ βj,hqth. (18)
Monotonic expectational differences together with equation (15) imply that the left-hand
side is bounded above by
j´1ÿ
k“i
Mÿ
h“1
pβk,h ´ βk`1,hqui,h “
Mÿ
h“1
pβi,h ´ βj,hqui,h. (19)
Equation (19) follows because equation (15) implies
řM
h“1pβk,h´βk`1,hquk,h is decreasing
in k.
Equations (18) and (19) implyÿ
h
βi,hrui,h ´ ths ě
ÿ
h
βj,hruj,h ´ ths.
Therefore, the incentive constraint that i does not report j, j ą i` 1 holds.
Finally, because we have all incentive compatibility constraints, it follows that, when
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ui satisfies Definition 4.1, the participation constraints for i ě 2 are implied by the
participation constraint for i “ 1.
Proposition D.1. The participation constraint for i “ 1 binds in the solution to (A).
Proof. Otherwise, let  “ β1 ¨pu1´tq and consider the mechanism that charges t˜h “ th`.
All incentive constraints continue to be satisfied, the participation constraint for i “ 1
holds, and revenue increases.
D.2 Proof of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3
We consider program (A) but with the following modifications:
1. The participation constraint binds for i “ 1.
2. We write everything in terms of distribution over posteriors as opposed to commu-
nication devices.
3. We replace the principal’s sequential rationality constraint by the correspondence
yµ˚pqq ” arg maxyPY pqq
řN
i“1 µiwipq, yq and the Bayesian plausibility constraint.
Therefore, we obtain
max
τ,a,t
Mÿ
h“1
τpµhq
Nÿ
i“1
µh,i
ÿ
qPQ
αhpqqrwipq, y˚hpqqq ` ths (A1)
s.t.
$’’&’’%
řM
h“1 τpµhqµh,1µ0,1 ru1h ´ ths “ 0řM
h“1 τpµhqpµh,iµ0,i ´
µh,k
µ0,k
qrui,h ´ ths ě 0, p@iqp@k P ti´ 1, i` 1uqřM
h“1 τpµhqµh,i “ µ0,i, i P t1, . . . , Nu
,
where ui,h is shorthand for
ř
qPQ αhpqquipq, yh˚pqqq.
Now fix an allocation a “ pα, t, yq where α : ∆pV q ÞÑ ∆˚pQq, t : ∆pV q ÞÑ R and
y : Q ˆ ∆pV q ÞÑ ∆˚pYq,µy˚pq, µqq, y˚pq, µq ” arg maxyPY pqqřµiwipq, yq, supp ypq, µq Ď
y˚pq, µq.
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Consider the program
max
τ
Mÿ
h“1
τpµhq
Nÿ
i“1
µh,i
ÿ
qPQ
αhpqqrwipq, yhpqqq ` ths (Aa)
s.t.
$’’&’’%
řM
h“1 τpµhqµh,1µ0,1 ru1h ´ ths “ 0řM
h“1 τpµhqpµh,iµ0,i ´
µh,k
µ0,k
qrui,h ´ ths ě 0, p@iqp@k P ti´ 1, i` 1uqřM
h“1 τpµhqµh,i “ µ0,i, i P t1, . . . , Nu
Note that not all allocations a can be made incentive compatible. To address this is-
sue, let Ca0 denote the policies τ that satisfy the constraints in (Aa). Letting f a0 pτq “řM
h“1 τpµhq
řN
i“1 µh,irwipqh, yhpqhqq ` ths, consider the modified objective function
f apτq “
#
f a0 pτq if τ P Ca0
´8 otherwise .
In what follows, f apτq is the objective function under consideration.
In Doval and Skreta (2018a), we extend the results in Le Treust and Tomala (2017) to
show that given a constrained maximization problem,32
cavg1,...,gKfpµ, γ1, . . . , γKq :“ sup
$’&’%
ÿ
m
λmfpµmq :
ř
m λmµm “ µ,ř
m λmglpµmq ě γl, l P t1, . . . , ru,ř
m λmglpµmq “ γl, l P tr ` 1, . . . , Ku
,/./- ,
(20)
where f, g1, . . . , gr, gr`1, . . . , gK : ∆pV q ÞÑ R Y t´8u is a tuple of functions defined on
∆pV q, it follows that
cavg1,...,gKfpµ, γ1, . . . , γKq “ cavf g1,...,gK pµ, γ1, . . . , γKq
32We extend the construction in their paper for completeness given that our problem includes multiple
inequality constraints and equality constraints.
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where f g1,...,gK : ∆pV q ˆ RK ÞÑ RY t´8u is such that
f g1,...,gK pµ, γ1, . . . , γKq “
#
fpµq if γi ď gipµq, i P t1, . . . , ru ^ γi “ gipµq, i P tr ` 1, . . . , Ku
´8 otherwise .
(21)
That is, the constrained Bayesian persuasion problem with r inequality constraints and
K ´ r equality constraints in (20) can be thought of a Bayesian persuasion problem in
which the objective has domain ∆pV q ˆ RK as defined in (21). We use this to derive
properties about the number of posteriors used in the optimal solution.
Note that (Aa) is a version of this program with r “ 2N ´ 2 and
gipµq “
„
µi
µ0,i
´ µi`1
µ0,i`1
ÿ
qPQ
αpµqpqqruipq, yµpqqq ´ tpµqs, i P t1, . . . N ´ 1u
gN´2`ipµq “
„
µi
µ0,i
´ µi´1
µ0,i´1
ÿ
qPQ
αpµqpqqruipq, yµpqqq ´ tpµqs, i P t2, . . . Nu
g2N´1pµq “ µ1
µ0,1
ÿ
qPQ
αpµqpqqru1pq, yµpqqq ´ tpµqs
and γi “ 0 for all i. We then have the following:
Corollary D.1. Suppose the value of (Aa) is finite. Then, τ puts positive probability in
at most 3N ´ 1 beliefs.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 3.1 in Doval and Skreta (2018a) and Carathe´odory’s
theorem (see, e.g., Rockafellar (1970)).
Similarly, we can construct a program pMaq
max
τ
Mÿ
h“1
τpµhq
Nÿ
i“1
µh,i
ÿ
qPQ
αhpqqrwipq, yhpqqq ` uipq, yhpqqq ´
ÿ
i`1ďl
µ0,l
µ0,i
pui`1,h ´ ui,hqs
s.t.
# řM
h“1 τpµhq
”
µh,i`1
µ0,i`1 ´
µh,i
µ0,i
ı
pui`1,h ´ ui,hq ě 0, i P t1, . . . , N ´ 1uřM
h“1 τpµhqµh “ µ0
(Ma)
Corollary D.2. Suppose the value of (Ma) is finite. Then τ puts positive probability
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on at most 2N ´ 1 beliefs.
Another immediate corollary is that dropping constraints from a program lowers the
upper bound on the number of beliefs in the support of the solution to the program:
Corollary D.3. Suppose the value of (Ma) is finite and only M constraints bind. Then,
τ puts positive probability on at most N `M beliefs.
Proof. See Corollary 3.2 in Doval and Skreta (2018a).
D.3 Example 2
The next example illustrates that even if the solution to the relaxed program, (R), satisfies
the monotonicity constraints (M), it may not be a solution to the original problem.
Example 2. Consider the sale of a durable good example in Section 2.1, but with three
types V ” tvL, vM , vHu. We provide a parametrization of the problem such that the
solution to the relaxed program (R) has the following properties:
1. In period 1, vH buys with probability 1, vL buys with probability 0, and vM buys
with positive probability (but bounded away from one).
2. The allocation satisfies the monotonicity constraints, (M).
3. The communication device generates two posteriors, µHM , µML, where33
µHMpvHq “ vM
vH
, µHMpvLq “ 0
µMLpvMq “ vL
vM
, µMLpvHq “ 0.
4. However, it is not possible to find two transfers, tpµHMq, tpµMLq, that satisfy that
(i) vL’s participation constraint binds, and (ii) both vM and vH ’s downward-looking
incentive constraints bind.
33The reader may recognize µHM , µLM as two of the extremal beliefs in Bergemann et al. (2015): µHM
makes the principal indifferent between setting a price of vM or vH , whereas µ
ML makes the principal
indifferent between setting a price of vM or vL. Indeed, the optimal mechanism for the principal need
only put weight on the extremal beliefs. Details are available from the authors upon request.
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The parameters are as follows.34 First, the prior is given by
µ0pvHq “ 0.4637, µ0pvLq “ 0.1194, µ0pvMq “ 0.4169,
and is chosen so that it is a convex combination of µHM , µML. The values for the types
are
vH “ 4.8385, vM “ 2.5528, vL “ 0.0357,
and are chosen so that vL’s virtual valuation is negative, whereas vM ’s virtual valuation
is positive. Also, we set δ “ 0.95. With these values, we have that
µHMpvHq “ 0.5276
µMLpvMq “ 0.0140.
and the communication device satisfies:
βpµHM |vHq “ 1
βpµML|vLq “ 1
βpµML|vMq “ µ
MLpvMqτpµMLq
µ0pvMq “
0.0140ˆ 0.8789
0.4169
Because vL never buys (the monopolist in period 1 recommends a price of vM is period 2),
it has to be that tpµMLq “ 0. To determine tpµHMq, we have the following two equations:
vH ´ tpµHMq “ βpµHM |vMqpvH ´ tpµHMqq`βpµML|vMqδ ˆ pvH ´ vMq
βpµHM |vMqpvM ´ tpµHMqq ` βpµML|vMqδ ˆ pvM ´ vMq “ ´tpµMLqδpvM ´ vMq “ 0.
The first equality implies tpµHMq “ vH´δpvH´vMq, whereas the second implies tpµHMq “
vM . Hence, it is not possible to find two transfers, tpµHMq, tpµMLq that satisfy that the
downward looking constraints bind and implements the solution to the relaxed program.
34The Matlab code, which implements the linear program used to derive the example, is available
upon request.
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E Output messages as recommendations
Proof of Proposition 5.1. We prove 2 implies 3. That 1 implies 2 follows from the results
of the paper. Because a straightforward mechanism is a particular case of a mechanism,
it follows immediately that 3 implies 1, thus completing the proof.
Thus, consider xpV, β,∆pV qq, αy and y : ∆pV q ˆ Q ÞÑ Y∆pY pqqq that solves (R),
or equivalently (3). The finite support assumption implies we can label tµ1, . . . , µHu
the posteriors that are induced with positive probability by the mechanism. Given h P
t1, . . . , Hu, let pQY qh “ tpq, yq : αhpqq ˆ yhpqqpyq ą 0u denote the pairs pq, yq that are
implemented when the belief is µh. Let pQY q˚ “ YhPHpQY qh. Consider now the following
mechanism xpV, β1, pQY q˚q, α1y and the continuation strategy y1 : pQY q˚ˆQ ÞÑ Y∆pY pqqq
such that α1pq,yqpq1q “ 1rq1 “ qs and y1pq,yqpqqpy1q “ 1ry1 “ ys. Moreover, let
β1ppq, yq|viq “
Hÿ
h“1
βpµh|viqαhpqqyhpqqpyq.
Clearly, this mechanism delivers the same payoff to the principal and the agent. We
now verify that it remains incentive compatible for the principal to follow the recom-
mendations. Fix pq, yq P pQY q˚. The principal’s belief upon observing the output pq, yq
is
µpq,yqpviq “ µ
0
iβ
1ppq, yq|viqř
j µ
0
jβ
1ppq, yq|vjq
“ µ
0
i
řH
h“1 βpµh|viqαhpqqyhpqqpyqř
j µ
0
j
řH
h“1 βpµh|vjqαhpqqyhpqqpyq
“
ÿ
hPH:pq,yqPpQY qh
µ0iβpµh|viqř
j1 µ
0
j1βpµh|vj1q
ř
j1 µ
0
j1βpµh|vj1qřH
h“1
ř
j µ
0
jβpµh|vjqαhpqqyhpqqpyq
“
ÿ
hPH:pq,yqPpQY qh
µh,i
τpµhqř
h1:pq,yqPpQY qh1 τpµh1q
,
where recall that τpµhq “ řNj“1 µ0jβpµj|vjq. Then the payoff of the second-period principal
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when he observes pq, yq and chooses y1 P Y pqq can be written as
ÿ
hPH:pq,yqPpQY qh
τpµhqř
h1:pq,yqPpQY qh1 τpµh1q
Nÿ
i“1
µh,iwipq, y1q ď
ÿ
hPH:pq,yqPpQY qh
τpµhqř
h1:pq,yqPpQY qh1 τpµh1q
Nÿ
i“1
µh,iwipq, yq,
where the inequality follows from knowing that yhpqqpyq ą 0 for all h such that pq, yq P
pQY qh.
Similarly, using the expression in (3), we can write the principal’s payoff from the new
mechanism conditional on the output being pq, yq as:
ÿ
hPH:pq,yqPpQY qh
τpµhqř
h1:pq,yqPpQY qh1 τpµh1q
Nÿ
i“1
µh,irwipq, y;µ0q ` uˆipq, y;µ0qs,
and note he has no incentive to choose another q, because for each h such that pq, yq P
pQY qh, we have that q is in the set of maximizers of řNi“1 µh,irwip¨, yµh ;µ0q`uˆip¨, yµh ;µ0qs.
F Implementation via contracts
Proof of Proposition 5.2. included to induce line break
Necessity: Assume there exists t1 such that pβ, q, yq satisfies (DIC-P). Consider i ă j
and µ, µ1 such that µpviqµ1pvjq ą 0. Then, the following must hold:
uipqpµq, ypµqq ´ t1pµq ě uipqpµ1q, ypµ1qq ´ t1pµ1q
ujpqpµ1q, ypµ1qq ´ t1pµ1q ě ujpqpµq, ypµqq ´ t1pµq,
which implies that
ujpqpµ1q, ypµ1qq ´ ujpqpµq, ypµqq ě uipqpµ1q, ypµ1qq ´ uipqpµq, ypµqq (22)
That is, letting
Dipµ1, µq “ uipqpµ1q, ypµ1qq ´ uipqpµq, ypµqq, (23)
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we need that
Djpµ1, µq ě Dipµ1, µq, whenever µ1pvjqµpviq ą 0. (DIC-M)
Note that Assumption 1 implies Dipµ, µ1q is strictly increasing in i. Thus, (DIC-M)
holds with strict inequality when i ă j.
To derive the necessary conditions for the communication device, β, suppose now that
µpviqµ1pviq ą 0 for βpµ|viqβpµ1|viq ą 0. Because pβ, q, yq satisfies (DIC-P) for t1,
t1pµq ´ t1pµ1q “ Dipµ, µ1q.
Because under Assumption 1 Dipµ, µ1q is strictly increasing in i, for all j ą i, it has to
be the case that µ1pvjq “ 0, and for all j ă i, it has to be the case that µpvjq “ 0. To
see this, note that if j ą i, then Djpµ, µ1q ą tpµq ´ tpµ1q, and hence vj ą vi can never
select the allocation at µ1. Likewise, if j ă i, then Djpµ, µ1q ă tpµq ´ tpµ1q, and hence
vj ă vi can never select the allocation at µ.
Moreover, if there are three beliefs µ, µ1, µ2 such that µpviqµ1pviqµ2pviq ą 0 such that
uipqpµq, ypµqq ě uipqpµ1q, ypµ1qq ě uipqpµ2q, ypµ2qq and Dipµ, µ1q and Dipµ1, µ2q are
strictly increasing in i, then it has to be the case that: (i) j ą i, then µ1pvjq “ µ2pvjq “ 0,
and (ii) j ă i, then µ1pvjq “ µpvjq “ 0. Then, µ1pviq “ 1. It follows then that there are
at most three beliefs at which vi has positive probability – if we had four or more, the
ones that give intermediate utility to vi assign probability one to vi. Hence, they must
correspond to the same belief.
Finally, suppose µpviqµ1pviq ą 0, Dipµ, µ1q ą 0 and µpvjq ą 0 for j ą i. We now show
that for all l P ti ` 1, . . . , j ´ 1u, it has to be the case that µpvlq ą 0. Towards a
contradiction, assume there exists vl, l P ti` 1, . . . , j ´ 1u such that µpvlq “ 0. Because
all types have positive probability, there exists µ1 : βpµ1|vlq ą 0. Because under t1,
pβ, q, yq satisfies (DIC-P), it follows that
ulpqpµ1q, ypµ1qq ´ t1pµ1q ě ulpqpµq, ypµqq ´ t1pµq.
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Because µpvjq ą 0, we have that
ujpqpµq, ypµqq ´ t1pµq ě ujpqpµ1q, ypµ1qq ´ t1pµ1q.
It follows that
Dlpµ1, µq ě Djpµ1, µq,
and under our assumption, this inequality is strict. Monotonic expectational differences
implies that
Dipµ1, µq ě Dlpµ1, µq ě t1pµ1q ´ t1pµq.
The above expression contradicts that pβ, q, yq satisfies (DIC-P) under t1, because vi
would strictly prefer to select the allocation in µ1 to the allocation in µ.
Sufficiency: Suppose pβ, q, yq satisfies the assumptions in the statement of the propo-
sition. Then, it is possible to label the beliefs µ1, . . . , µM so that k ă l implies that
vpµkq ” maxtv : µkpvq ą 0u ď vpµlq ” mintv : µlpvq ą 0u.
Set t1pµ1q “ u1pqpµ1q, ypµ1qq. Note that, by definition, v1 “ vpµ1q. For n ą 1, define
recursively
t1pµnq “ uvpµnqpqpµnq, ypµnqq ´ puvpµnqpqpµn´1q, ypµn´1qq ´ t1pµn´1qq. (24)
We now verify that pβ, q, yq together with t1 satisfies (DIC-P). We first check that vi is
indifferent between µ and µ1 whenever µpviqµ1pviq ą 0. Monotonicity of the information
structure induced by β implies that, without loss of generality, vi “ vpµq “ vpµ1q;
moreover, µ “ µl, µ1 “ µk, with k P tl ` 1, l ` 2u and if k “ l ` 2, then vi “ vpµl`1q “
vpµl`1q.
Consider first the case in which k “ l ` 1. Then, it follows from equation (24) that
t1pµl`1q ´ t1pµlq “ uipqpµl`1q, ypµl`1qq ´ uipqpµlq, ypµlqq,
so vi is indeed indifferent. Now consider the case in which k “ l` 2, then recalling that
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vpµl`1q “ vpµl`2q “ vi, we have
t1pµl`1q ´ t1pµlq “ uipqpµl`1q, ypµl`1qq ´ uipqpµlq, ypµlqq,
t1pµl`2q ´ t1pµl`1q “ uipqpµl`2q, ypµl`2qq ´ uipqpµl`1q, ypµl`1qq,
so that vi is indifferent between selecting the outcome that corresponds to either of the
three beliefs, µl, µl`1, µl`2. Finally, we show that when the agent is of type vi, she does
not want to announce any other belief µk such that µkpviq “ 0. To see this, let µlpviq ą 0
and consider the case in which l ă k. Note first that
t1pµlq “ u1pqpµ1q, ypµ1qq `
lÿ
n“2
puvpµnqpqpµnq, ypµnqq ´ uvpµnqpqpµn´1q, ypµn´1qqq,
so that
t1pµkq ´ t1pµlq “
kÿ
n“l`1
puvpµnqpqpµnq, ypµnqq ´ uvpµnqpqpµn´1q, ypµn´1qqq
“
kÿ
n“l`1
Dvpµnqpµn, µn´1q.
Then,
uipqpµlq, ypµlqq ´ uipqpµkq, ypµkqq ` t1pµkq ´ t1pµlq “
“ uipqpµlq, ypµlqq ´ uipqpµkq, ypµkqq `
kÿ
n“l`1
Dvpµnqpµn, µn´1q
ě uipqpµlq, ypµlqq ´ uipqpµkq, ypµkqq `
kÿ
n“l`1
Dipµn, µn´1q “ 0,
where the inequality follows from (DIC-M). A similar argument shows that the same
holds for l ą k.
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